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ARTICLES
Searching for the Structural Vision of City
of Boerne v. Flores: Vertical and
Horizontal Tensions in the New
Constitutional Architecture
by THOMAS W. BEiMERS*
I. Introduction
In a recent decision determining that section 13981 of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act' exceeds the authority of Congress under
both the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, J. Harvie Wilkinson HI, Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, filed a fascinating concurring opinion.2 In it, he identified,
and defended against the imperative of judicial restraint, a recent line
of Supreme Court and lower court opinions that represent a self-de-
scribed "third era" of twentieth-century judicial activism. The con-
temporary activism, as Wilkinson characterizes it, is informed by a
desire to stringently enforce the structural mechanisms of dual sover-
eignty.' This structural end, in the view of its proponents, distin-
guishes the current wave of activism from that exhibited during the
Lochner and Warren Court eras. In contrast to decisions typifying
earlier jurisprudential shifts, Wilkinson does not see the current struc-
tural activism purposefully promoting the interests of any particular
constituency.4 Rather, the role of the judicial branch is that of a struc-
* Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington D.C. B.A., Macalester College,
1991. J.D., Univesity of Minnesota, 1998. The author would like to thank Kaitlin A. Hal-
lett, the Honorable Gerald W. Heaney, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and
Professor Philip P. Frickey for their invaluable insights, criticisms and support.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §13981 (West 1999).
2. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 889 (4th
Cir. 1999) (Wflkinson, J., concurring).
3. See id. at 893 (enumerating the decisions representative of Court's activist stance).
4. See id. ("[T]he cases of the present era cannot be seen as single-mindedly promot-
ing the interests of a particular constituency.") During the Lochner era, the Court em-
[789]
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tural referee, arbitrating the proper allocation of power between the
federal and state governments. 5
While insisting that the contemporary activist judiciary does not
play the role of "substantive adjudicators," Wilkinson nonetheless al-
lows that the second-era activism of the Warren Court "presaged-
and indeed guaranteed-a cyclical correction."' 6 Wilkinson's use of
the term "correction" in this context seems to belie the assertion that
there is no substantive aspect to "ascendant federalism" 7-and that no
ployed a constitutional theory that consistently favored the interests of business as against
workers. See e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (rejecting New York maximum
hour law); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking congressional attempt to
bar goods made by child labor from interstate commerce); Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of
D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (rejecting federal minimum wage law). The Warren Court, on
the other hand, applied a theory of judicial review that self-consciously favored the inter-
ests of racial, religious, and other minorities against government-sanctioned discriminatory
policies. See e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating racial segre-
gation in public schools); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (striking state refusal to
grant unemployment benefits to individual who refused, due to religious convictions, to
work on Saturdays). Both periods have been subject to substantial bodies of commentary
and criticism. See generally TiH WARREN COURT: A RETRosPEcrvE (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1996) (examining the Warren Court's jurisprudence, the Justices, and the Court's im-
pact on the nation); PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITIcs: THE ANAT-
omy OF Lochner v. New York (1990) (providing detailed historical, social and legal account
of Lochner decision, its precursors and aftermath); PAUL L. MuRPHY, THE CoNsTITUTION
IN CRisis TIMEs, 1918-1969 (1972).
5. 169 F.3d at 895 (describing the jurisprudence of federalism as "purely allocative"
and the courts as "structural referees").
6. Id. at 893.
7. I use the terms "ascendant" or "resurgent" federalism, rather than simply "federal-
ism" or "new" (or even "new-new," see Symposium, National Power and State Autonomy:
Calibrating the New "New Federalism," 32 IND. L. REv. 1 (1998)) federalism in order to
emphasize several features that differentiate the current model of federalism from that of
earlier eras. The current devolution is driven by largely market-based considerations, see
generally Symposium, The Allocation of Government Authority, 83 VA. L. REv. 1275
(1997) (exploring the economics of federalism); Symposium, The Law & Economics of
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. Rv. 249 (1998) (same), whereas the federalist arguments of ear-
lier eras were characterized by a barely concealed racism, see Robert Cover, The Origins of
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1302-03 (1982) (noting
that the early Republican strategy of appealing to black voters failed because "too few
southerners could perceive any set of issues as more important than preventing Blacks
from enjoying the advantages that would have come from full political participation").
Additionally, the choice of language is a modestly poetic attempt to suggest that the place
of federalism in the new constitutional architecture transcends its place in earlier structural
paradigms. Other commentators have also recognized that the trajectory of current judi-
cial opinion supports this choice of modifiers. See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic
Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REv. 849, 851 (1999) ("[The
theory that our constitutional structure necessitates judicial intervention in order to ensure
proper allocation between state and federal interests] had a brief run after National League
of Cities v. Usery, [426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)] and now again is ascendant"). As Professor Jefferson Powell
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particular constituency is consistently disserved by its application.
And in fact, Wilkinson succinctly frames the subject matter of this Ar-
ticle by asserting that "[a]s states themselves began to respect the civil
rights of all their citizens, however, the justification for additional
[federal] restrictions began to wear thin." In the view of Wilkinson,
and presumably other proponents of ascendant federalism, the social
realities that justified placing severe restrictions on state authority no
longer exist to an extent that offsets the countervailing interest in cul-
tivating the values of federalism. For Wilkinson, then, the agonizing
question is whether the project of devolution of power to the states
warrants activism in the service of federalism and a correlative rejec-
tion of judicial restraint.9
Judge Wilkinson's questioning of whether federalism is suffi-
ciently valuable to warrant rejection of judicial restraint and the re-
peal of a popularly enacted piece of legislation is an interesting and
difficult one.' This article does not question, however, whether judi-
cial enforcement of federalism principles is a worthwhile," or achieva-
has noted, revolutionary-era political labels create terminological problems for the modern
reader. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71
N.C. L. REv. 949, 955 n.30 (1993). While at one point in time, "federalist" connoted an
advocate of strong central government, the term has generally referred to proponents of a
balanced federal/state power structure, with a bias toward retention of state power. The
simple version of the events that led to the confusion is that proponents of national govern-
ment appropriated the term "federalist" in order to convince the public that the proposed
form of government was not a break with the previous federalist system. See FEDERALISM:
THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 12 (Martin B. Cohen, ed. 1988). For a more elaborate
explanation, see the sources cited supra.
8. 169 F.3d at 892.
9. See id. at 890 (submitting that the decision "pits the obligation to preserve the
values of our federal system against the imperative of judicial restraint").
10. The counter-majoritarian problem referred to by Judge Wilkinson is frequently
termed the "root difficulty" with judicial review. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, Tim LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANcH 16 (1962). How, the question goes, can an unelected, unaccountable
institution overrule the will of the people as demonstrated through the actions of elected
representatives and thus overturn legislation such as the Violence Against Women Act?
My own answer is suggested by the theoretical premise underlying this article - that certain
values are, in any system, analytically prior to others. In a democratic system, participation
is a first principle. Thus, for example, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a
case said to pose serious counter-majoritarian problems, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 31-35 (1959), is supportable
on the basis that it vindicated core democratic values. See JoiiN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 87-88 (1980) (arguing that judges should
endorse democratic norms presumptively ratified by the American political community).
11. Only through experimentation will we gain any clear picture of how devolution
impacts government. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MiNN. L. REv. 317
(1998); New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Professor Friedman suggests that what is lacking in the current debate is any empirical
approach to the issue of whether increasing federalism-based restrictions on federal power
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ble,12 endeavor. It instead examines the implications of this
development for congressional implementation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Constitution instructs, in the form of the Civil War
Amendments, that certain personal political protections, 3 embodied
in the substantive and procedural guarantees of those amendments,
outweigh the structural interests embodied in the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments. 4 In addition, conventional wisdom holds that the tem-
poral order of constitutional amendments insulates rights enumerated
in the Fourteenth Amendment from structural restrictions listed in
is warranted. While he suspects that federalism will ultimately vindicate values that most
Americans hold dear, Friedman admits that more information is necessary. See Friedman,
supra at 380.
12. On the limitations of judicially enforceable federalism, see generally Moulton, Jr.,
supra note 7 (contending that judicial enforcement of federalism principles is unsupported
by constitutional text, structure, or history).
13. I use the terms protections rather than rights both because it is more apt as both a
descriptive and a rhetorical matter and is responsive to the appropriation by conservatives
of the term "rights." See Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of
Antidiscrimination Law, 97 Mrc-s. L. R v. 564 (1998) (noting that conservative commenta-
tors, and even some courts, attempt to subvert the meaning of antidiscrimination law by
characterizing protections as "special rights"); see eg., Brown v. North Carolina Div. of
Motor Vehicles, 987 F. Supp. 451, 458-59 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (finding that the Americans with
Disabilities Act is not remedial legislation, but instead was designed to create special enti-
tlements for the disabled). Resistance to and antipathy toward antidiscrimination law oc-
curs in part because the erection of a barrier to discrimination does not eradicate the
impulse to discriminate. An unintended consequence of this lag is that those predisposed
to violate the rules may interpret the constraints on their behavior as a requirement that
they treat others in a "special" manner. See Rubin, supra at 571. Rubin's definition of
antidiscrimination law reflects my sense that "protections" is a superior term: "Antidis-
crimination law is the primary means by which organized society protects individuals
against disadvantageous treatment on the basis of their membership in certain groups,
archetypally racial or ethnic minority groups." Id at 568.
14. The Tenth Amendment restricts Congress from commandeering a state's legisla-
tive or executive functions through direct compulsion. See New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 175 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 934 (1997).
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Though the text of the Constitution appears to
delimit only Article III diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has construed this lan-
guage to bar citizens from bringing suit against their own state in federal court. See Atas-
cadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890)). The Court has justified its expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment
by reference to the dual principles of federalism and sovereign immunity. See id.; see also
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,54 (1996) (stating that "we have understood
the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposi-
tion.., which it confirms") (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,
779 (1991)).
earlier constitutional amendments.'" The current string of federalism-
based decisions, however, challenges these traditional notions.
One such decision, City of Boerne v. Flores6 ("Boerne"), sits at
the intersection of federal-state (vertical) and judicial-congressional
(horizontal) tensions brought about by judicial enforcement of feder-
alism principles. Specifically, it sets Congress' enforcement power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment against both judicial
responsibility for defining the contours of substantive constitutional
law, and more importantly, the increasing judicial tendency to act as
custodian of state sovereignty against an ostensibly overreaching Con-
gress. In purporting to apply Boerne, lower courts have issued strik-
ingly divergent opinions regarding the constitutional propriety of
antidiscrimination legislation under Congress' section 5 power. Some
courts view Boerne as a "landmark" decision announcing significant
change in our constitutional architecture 7 and have accordingly inter-
preted it to substantially cabin congressional power.' 8 Other courts
have read Boerne primarily as a separation of powers decision by fo-
cusing on Congress' power to inform Fourteenth Amendment con-
cerns in the absence of any judicial mandate.' 9 With Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents,20 the Supreme Court will presumably resolve some
of the questions left over by Boerne.
15. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 ("In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56
(1976), we recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal power at the
expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal
power struck by the Constitution.").
16. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
17. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 463 (4th Cir. 1998). Use of the architecture
metaphor in describing the allocation of governmental power is not uncommon. See, e.g.,
Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradition:
Modem Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & PoL'Y Rnv. 227 (1996); Paul M.
Bator, The Constitution As Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Arti-
cle III, 65 IND. L. J. 233 (1989) (advocating view that framers' article III design supports
flexible institutional architecture).
18. See Brown v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999); Humenan-
sky v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998).
19. These decisions have failed to yield consistent outcomes. Compare Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting ADEA as proper exercise of
congressional enforcement power) with Goshtasby v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill.,
141 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding ADEA as proper exercise of congressional en-
forcement power) and Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding
ADA as proper exercise of Congress' section 5 enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
20. 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, - U.S. - 119 S.Ct. 901 (1999).
Though Kimel addressed Congress' enforcement power in the context of both the ADA
and the ADEA, the Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the ADEA issue. See __
U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 901; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 98-796 (stating questions
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In anticipation of that decision, this Article, using recent deci-
sions regarding the constitutional propriety under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") as vehicles,
argues that Boerne is explainable solely on the basis of separation of
powers grounds. In contrast to the preponderance of those decisions
applying Boerne, however, this Article acknowledges that federalism
is an important aspect of the Court's analysis. Nonetheless, it also
contends that courts adopting a strong federalist interpretation of
Boerne unnecessarily privilege structural concerns at the expense of
analytically prior democratic principles.
Some of the seemingly irreconcilable tensions descended from
Boerne's simultaneous treatment of separation of powers and federal-
ism considerations can be ameliorated by examining each plane sepa-
rately. After encapsulating the decision and its antecedents in Part I,
Part II situates Boerne comfortably within extant separation of powers
doctrine. That section then evaluates two distinct problems posed by
Boerne. The easier problem involves the question of whether Con-
gress retains any role in enforcing equal protection after Boerne. Af-
ter establishing that it does, the remainder of the section examines
problems in defining the contours of this role, focusing particular at-
tention on how the enterprise of judicial deference to congressional
factfinding operates in the Fourteenth Amendment context. This sec-
tion concludes that courts reading Boerne to signal a change in inter-
branch relations have adopted too narrow a stance toward the case.
Turning to the vertical plane, part III contends that courts have
not properly dealt with the allusions to federalism contained in the
Boerne decision. Properly understood, federalism analysis forms one
component of judicial tests-refined, but not created, by Boerne-
designed to check congressional overreaching under the Fourteenth
Amendment power. However, the strong federalist reading of
Boerne, in which federalism principles form a constraint on congres-
sional power independent from separation of powers principles, not
only misrepresents the Court's opinion, but also offends basic demo-
cratic norms that are analytically prior to the structural values vindi-
cated through judicial federalism. Part III concludes by suggesting
that the federalism principles subscribed to by Louis Brandeis-and
presented), <<http://www.usdoj.gov/osglbriefs/1998/2pet/7pet/98-0796.pet.aa.html>>; infra
notes 145-54 and accompanying text (discussing issues posed by Kimel and proposing
analysis).
often cited as authority by proponents of ascendant federalism2' -
support such a nuanced perspective. Because Brandeis embraced
both centrifugal values in governmental authority and principles of
equal citizenship, his social views afford a particularly rich ground for
resolving the tension suggested by Boerne.
This Article concludes that Boerne is not a landmark decision,
but rather an affirmation of Marbury v. Madison's structural assign-
ment to the Court of the decisive role in constitutional interpretation.
In sustaining the Court's canonic role, Boerne clarified the relation-
ship between the Court's definitional capacity and Congress' power to
enforce the Civil War Amendments, but did not subvert congressional
power to vindicate the political protection associated with democratic
society.
H. City of Boerne v. Flores
A. Antecedent Cases Interpreting Scope of Congress' Section 5
Power
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, known
collectively as the Civil War Amendments, were added to the Consti-
tution during Reconstruction and were designed, respectively, to pro-
hibit slavery, protect individuals from state deprivation of privileges
and immunities, due process of law, or equal protection, and accord
all male citizens the right to vote.22 Each Amendment contains an
enforcement mechanism, granting Congress the power to enforce
these substantive provisions.'
Relying at least in part on language in earlier decisions construing
Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment,24
21. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 264 (1983) (Burger, J., dissenting);
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 600-601 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steven G.
Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United
States v. Lopez, 94 MicH. L. REv. 752, 777 (1995).
22. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1; U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1. The right to vote was not conferred on women of any racial background
until much later. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 2.
24. In Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), an early decision construing the Civil
War Amendments, the Court stated a broad interpretation of Congress' enforcement
power. Taking as its premise that the amendments were intended to bring blacks into
"[p]erfect equality of civil rights with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the
States," the Court recognized that "some legislation is contemplated to make the Amend-
ments fully effective." Id. at 345. To that end, the Court ruled that congressional power
encompassed:
Summer 19991 VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL TENSIONS
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the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan' determined that this power was
coextensive with the broad power accorded to Congress under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.26 The Court had earlier made the same
determination with respect to Congress' enforcement power under the
Fifteenth Amendment. 7 Similarly, in the Civil Rights Cases, the
Court had observed that section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment con-
ferred on Congress "power to pass all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery."'a That these formula-
tions properly captured the relationship between Congress' express
powers and those powers reserved to the states is reinforced by the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment. An earlier version of section 1
read: "The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all per-
sons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty,
and property. 29
As Justice Brennan noted in the Morgan decision, the "substitu-
tion of the 'appropriate legislation' formula was never thought to have
the effect of diminishing the scope of this congressional power. "30
Morgan involved a challenge to section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, which invalidated a New York literacy requirement. 31 De-
spite the Court's earlier determination, in Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections,32 that the literacy tests did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
upheld section 4(e) as a proper exercise of Congress' section 5 pow-
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibi-
tions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality
of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion,
if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.
I& at 345-46.
25. 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966).
26. See id. at 650 (stating "classic formulation" of Necessary and Proper Clause). That
formulation reads: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
27. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (equating Congress'
power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment with that under the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
28. 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
29. H.R. Rep. No. 39-63 (1865).
30. See 384 U.S. at 650 n.9 (citation omitted).
31. See 384 U.S. at 646-47.
32. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
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ers.3 3 In other words, the Court ruled that a law does not have to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment in order for Congress to legislate
on that topic under section 5.
The Court offered two distinct rationales. The first might be
termed the "deference" rationale. This rationale was based on the
observation that requiring a judicial determination of a constitutional
violation as a condition of any congressional enactment under the
Fourteenth Amendment would confine Congress to the role of scriv-
eners codifying Supreme Court opinions. 34 In assessing whether a
congressional enactment usurped the judicial role of defining equal
protection, the Court stated that legislation is "appropriate" if it may
be "regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause,
is 'plainly adapted to that end,' and whether it is not prohibited by but
is consistent with the 'letter and spirit of the constitution."' 35 The
question, in turn, of whether the legislation was "plainly adapted" was
to be assessed by reference to the factual predicate for congressional
action. 6
33. See 384 U.S. at 646-47. Previously, in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966),
the Court had intimated that it would accord a broad power to Congress under section 5.
See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITTIONAL LAw:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 19.3 at 526-27 (2d ed. 1992) ("The Court held that the
indictment [against private individuals for intimidating blacks from using facilities of inter-
state commerce] should not have been dismissed ... because a conspiracy against the
constitutional right to use the facilities of interstate commerce, 'whether or not motivated
by racial discrimination [is] a proper object of the federal law."'). While the Guest Court
disavowed any intent to determine the breadth of Congress' power under section 5, see 383
U.S. at 755, six justices expressly repudiated the Civil Rights Cases' requirement of state
action on the ground that such a rule reduced the legislative enforcement power, see id. at
782-83. This dicta framed the question at issue in Morgan.
34. 384 U.S. at 648-49 ("A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determina-
tion that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the [Fourteenth]
Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate
both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the
Amendment. It would confine the legislative power.., to the insignificant role of abrogat-
ing only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional,
or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the 'majestic gener-
alities' of § 1 of the Amendment.") (footnote and citation omitted).
35. Id. at 650-51.
36. The Court noted several potential factual predicates for the conclusion that Puerto
Ricans in New York needed additional political protections in order to gain nondiscrimina-
tory treatment. See id. at 652-53 (observing the Congress could have weighed considera-
tions including the pervasiveness of discriminatory treatment, the efficacy of eliminating
voting restrictions, the level of intrusiveness on state interests, and the adequacy or availa-
bility of alternative remedies). At root, congressional action was justified because access
to the right to vote was preservative in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in all arenas of
life.
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The second Morgan rationale came to be referred to as the
"ratchet" theory. In reality, the rationale was one of congressional
self-definition of its enforcement power; the ratchet theory - by which
Congress could increase the degree of protection afforded by the Con-
stitution's substantive provisions, but not decrease them37-simply
made the broader rationale somewhat more palatable. Though the
opinion is not entirely clear on this point, the Court intimated that
Congress had an independent authority to define the scope of equal
protection. 8
The broad and opaque language of the majority opinion in Mor-
gan caused concern that Congress' section 5 power, if it included the
power of self-definition, was virtually unlimited, and that such a ruling
would undermine the foundational principles of Marbury v.
Madison.39  Justice Harlan, in particular, worried that the decision
conferred on Congress an unbridled independent authority to deter-
mine the substantive meaning of equal protection.40 This fear was al-
layed by Oregon v. Mitchell,4 in which seven justices indicated that
37. The basic statement of the ratchet theory is contained in a footnote responding to
the dissent's concern that an independent congressional interpretive authority could be
used to dilute or even eviscerate constitutional rights. See id. at 651-52 n.10. The argument
that section 5 operates as a one-way ratchet, allowing Congress to expand but not contract
rights, is premised on the notion that Supreme Court rulings limiting the meaning of a
constitutional provision do not logically preclude legislation on the same subject. See gen-
erally Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589 (1996) (defending the ratchet theory).
38. Not all commentators read Morgan exactly alike. Compare David P. Currie,
RFRA, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 637, 642 (1998) (reading the Morgan Court's conclusion
that restriction of literacy tests was necessary to ensure nondiscriminatory treatment as
separate and distinct from deference to congressional findings that restriction of literacy
tests was necessary to ensure nondiscriminatory treatment) with Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is a Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. &
MARY L. Rev. 601, 610-12 (1998) (reading Morgan Court's deference to congressional
findings to be tantamount to holding that Congress could independently define equal pro-
tection). This confusion is due to the vagueness of the opinion. See William G. Buss, An
Essay on Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act, 83 IowA L. REv. 391, 410 (1998) (describing the paragraph in Morgan from
which courts and commentators derived the ratchet theory as "bland and undifferentiated"
and "not a model of clarity"). Analysis of the Morgan opinion is further complicated by
subsequent developments. See id. at 410 n.110 (explaining that as voting rights jurispru-
dence developed, strict scrutiny would have been applied on the facts of Morgan).
39. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also William Cohen, Congressional Power to In-
terpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. Rev. 603, 606 (1975) (noting objec-
tion that strong reading of Morgan would stand Marbury on its head).
40. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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section 5 does not confer on Congress such an unlimited power.'
Though the various opinions in Oregon v. Mitchell failed to delineate
the precise parameters of congressional power under section 5, the
Court's decision indicated that while Congress may independently ar-
rive at the conclusion that particular state action constitutes invidious
discrimination in violation of Equal Protection, even if the judiciary
has yet to reach such a conclusion, that power does not permit Con-
gress to alter the substance of Fourteenth Amendment rights as previ-
ously defined by the Supreme Court.43 With Boerne, the Court
definitively laid to rest fears of too broad congressional power. The
Boerne Court rejected the ratchet theory reading of Morgan, instead
reading both rationales to countenance judicial deference while re-
taining final authority to define the amendment's substantive force.'
B. The Decision
Boerne addressed the issue of whether the Religious Freedom
Reformation Act ("RFRA") was a proper exercise of Congress' sec-
tion 5 power.45 RFRA was enacted in response to the Court's ruling,
in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Services of Oregon v. Smith,4 6
that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment47 does not re-
42. See ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 33, at 531 (discussing the fragmented opin-
ions in Oregon v. Mitchell).
43. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 295-96 (Stewart, J., concurring); Cohen, supra
note 39, at 610-12 (determining that Mitchell rejected broad reading of Morgan). In Mitch-
ell, the Court by a 5-4 margin, (Justice Black providing the swing vote and announcing the
judgment) held that a provision of the 1970 Voting Rights Act lowering the minimum vot-
ing age from 21 to 18 was valid as applied to general elections but not authorized by the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to state and local elections.
A unanimous Court upheld the provision suspending use of literacy tests in all elections.
The fragmented nature of the decision may have contributed to lower court confusion
regarding the outer bounds of Congress' section 5 powers. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Power of Congress Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of Boerne
v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REv. 163, 177-78 (1998) (discussing significance of Mitchell). This
partially explains the tendency of some courts to view the Boerne decision as a
"landmark." See, e.g., Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 463 n.7 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing
Boerne as both a "landmark" and a "ground breaking" decision). Of course, this reading
of Boerne is also explained by an ideological propensity toward judicial enforcement of
federalism. See supra notes 3-11 (discussing Fourth Circuit's federalism-based activism).
44. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528 (1997).
45. The litigation arose out of a permit application by the Archbishop of San Antonio
seeking to expand a church located in the city's historic preservation district in order to
accommodate a growing parish. See id. at 512. Relying on the historic-district ordinance,
the city denied the application. The Archbishop then brought an action claiming that de-
nial of its permit application violated RFRA.
46. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
47. Id. at 877. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... ." U.S. CONST., amend. I (emphasis added). The
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quire neutral laws of general applicability to be justified by a compel-
ling government interest even when such laws significantly burden
religious practices.48 RFRA stated that its purpose was "(1) to restore
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and to guar-
antee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is sub-
stantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons
whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.
49
As that statement of purpose denotes, the Smith decision effected a
dramatic change in Free Exercise jurisprudence.5" The popular re-
Free Exercise Clause is applicable to the states via incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
48. See 521 U.S. at 515 (stating the holding of Smith). The Smith decision has been
widely vilified, both by dissenting members of the Court and by academic, religious, and
political commentators. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 570-71 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (expressing doubt concerning precedential value of
Smith rule); Smith, 494 U.S. at 894-901; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. RFv. 1109, 1120-27 (1990); Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. COr. RFv. 1; Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v.
Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REv. 259. But see Wil-
liam P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Cm. L. Rtv.
308 (1991).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1998).
50. See generally McConnell, supra note 48 at 1120-27 (describing conceptual division
between Smith and prior Free Exercise cases). Prior to Smith, the Court when faced with a
claim that a government regulation violated free exercise asked (1) whether the regulation
was a substantial burden on religious practice; and (2) if so, whether the burden was justi-
fied by a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680, 699 (1989); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205,215 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,403 (1963). After Smith, gener-
ally applicable criminal laws cannot be challenged as a violation of free exercise so long as
they are not motivated by a desire to punish religious practices and do not single out reli-
gious behavior for punishment. See 494 U.S. at 878. For example, the plaintiffs in Smith
challenged the application of a general criminal law prohibiting the use of peyote to mem-
bers of a Native American religion who ingested the drug for sacramental purposes. See
id. at 876. The plaintiffs, two members of the Native American Church, were fired from
their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation center because they used peyote at a religious
ceremony. The Oregon Employment Division subsequently denied their application for
unemployment benefits because of their misconduct and the Supreme Court upheld the
state's decision, ruling that individuals could not challenge neutral laws of general applica-
bility. See id. at 877-88. Though Oregon, like most states, defines it as a controlled sub-
stance, see Ore. Stat. Rev. § 475.005(6) (1987), peyote, along with other natural
hallucinogenic substances, has long been used for religious ceremonial purposes, see OMR
CALL STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY 17, 30 (1987) (dating religious use of
peyote to 10,000 years before European discovery of America); see also People v. Woody,
394 P.2d 813, 817-18 (Cal.1964) (describing use of peyote in ceremonies); Rashelle Perry,
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith. A Hallucinogenic Treat-
ment of the Free Exercise Clause, 17 J. CoNTEmp. LAw 359 (1991) (detailing peyote ritual of
Native American Church).
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sponse to Smith was one of outrage and dismay.5 1 Political support for
a statutory solution to the perceived problem of judicial insensitivity
to religious conviction was "so widespread as to indicate a national
consensus."5 2 Thus Congress set the groundwork for Boerne by ex-
plicitly and with great fanfare purporting to efface a Supreme Court
decision regarding the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. 3
After an unusually concise statement of the facts informing the
litigation, Justice Kennedy began the statutory background section
with a sentence that provides the key to the opinion: "Congress en-
acted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)." 54 Given that purpose, it is not surprising that the Court felt
compelled to respond to the challenge to its authority.55 The response
came in the form of a patent rebuke. Justice Kennedy opened the
discussion by stating that "[u]nder our Constitution, the Federal gov-
ernment is one of enumerated powers,"56 and both began and ended
the discussion section of the opinion with allusions to Marbury v.
Madison.17 A basic principle of American law accords the role of de-
ciding on the meaning of the Constitution to the judiciary, and Con-
gress had openly flaunted that rule. 8
After setting forth the constitutional provisions relevant to the
case, Kennedy turned to the antecedent cases.59 He began by reiterat-
51. The decision was termed "'disastrous,' 'dastardly and unprovoked,' [and] 'devas-
tating"' by lawmakers. See Neal Devins, How Not To Challenge the Court, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 645, 645 (1998) (citations omitted).
52. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Sig-
nificance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 39 (1995). The political consen-
sus was stunning. Conservative Christian organizations and civil liberties concerns both
supported RFRA and it passed through Congress with almost unanimous support. See
Katherine A. Murphy, City of Boerne v. Flores.: Another Boost For Federalism, 76 N.C. L.
Rnv. 1424 (1998) (giving political background of RFRA).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1998); Devins, supra note 51, at 645 ("Congress should
have known better, so should the Clinton White House.").
54. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
55. As Professor Gardbaum has observed, "in none of the handful of [other] modern
Section 5 cases has the stated purpose of the challenged legislation been to overrule the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution." Stephen Gardbaum, The Federalism
Implications of Flores, 39 Wm. & MARY L. Rnv. 699, 665 n.5 (1998).
56. 521 U.S. at 516 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 405
(1819)).
57. See 521 U.S. at 516,536 (citing 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). As Professor Devins
has wryly observed, in "critical respects, [Boerne] reads like a high school civics lesson."
Devins, supra note 51, at 645.
58. This proposition, first established in Marbury, was subsequently reinforced in
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,549 (1969).
59. 521 U.S. at 517 (quoting text of Fourteenth Amendment).
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ing the broad scope of Congress's section 5 powers as set forth in Ex
Parte Virginia and Katzenbach v. Morgan.60 Justice Kennedy took
pains to describe section 5 power as both remedial and preventative,
using those terms in tandem no less than ten times in the course of the
opinion. 61 In this way, the Court reinforced the basic premise of Mor-
gan-that Congress could pass legislation "which deters or remedies
constitutional violations ... even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the states." 62
Having reestablished the broad nature of Congress's section 5
power, the Court turned to the question of its limits. 63 The natural
starting point for that inquiry is the question of what it means to have
"the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
section 1."6 The Court noted that the term "enforce" had earlier
been characterized as "remedial. ' 65 The use of that term to character-
ize Congress's power suggested that the power to define the "provi-
sions of section 1" lie elsewhere. That "elsewhere" was with the
Court. The Court's role is to interpret. Congress's role is to enforce.
The distinction between "interpretation" on one hand and "en-
forcement" on the other is of course not so simple as this dichotomy
suggests.6 6 It is in fact difficult to say when one stops "enforcing" and
begins "altering" the meaning of equal protection. Acknowledging
that the line "is not easy to discern," the Court fashioned a test requir-
60. See id. at 517 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 34546 (1879) (quoted in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966)) (stating Congress has the power under
the Fourteenth Amendment to enact "[w]hatever legislation is appropriate" to carry out
the objectives of that amendment); supra note 25 (quoting passage in full).
61. See 521 U.S. passim.
62. 384 U.S. at 650-51 (quoting Morgan Court's observation that "a construction of
section 5 that would require a judicial determination of a constitutional violation would
depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility"). This
point was illustrated by reference to South Carolina v. Katzenbach. See 384 U.S. at 518
(citing 383 U.S. 310, 308 (1966)). In that case, the Court upheld Congress' suspension of
literacy tests through the Voting Rights Act, despite its previous decision, in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 49 (1959), that the tests did not violate
equal protection. Congress had passed the Voting Rights Act under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. However, the Court stated that Congress' enforcement power under section 2 of
that amendment was "parallel" to that of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 27.
63. The Court cited Justice Black's statement that "'[a]s broad as the congressional
enforcement power is, it is not unlimited."' Id. (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
128 (1970)).
64. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § 5.
65. 521 U.S. at 519 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326).
66. Professor Buss refers to "the exaggerated contrast between remedial and substan-
tive powers." Buss, supra note 38, at 425.
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ing "congruence and proportionality." In essence, "congruence" re-
quires a tight fit between the wrong to be prevented and the means to
be adopted,67 while "proportionality" requires that the invasive de-
gree or scope of legislation correspond to the degree or scope of the
constitutional harm between the wrong to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted."6 For example, a particularly virulent and
pervasive instance of unconstitutional state action would support
strong remedial and preventative measures. A less offensive degree
of unconstitutional conduct would not warrant the same response. To
make its point, the Court compared the social reality underlying the
Voting Rights Act with that supporting RFRA.6 9 In stark contrast to
the pervasive incidents of racial discrimination and injustice that
plagued (and continue to plague) our country and informed the ear-
lier decisions of Congress and the Court, the legislative record of
RFRA revealed a paucity of discriminatory actions targeting
religion.7 °
Nonetheless, the Court diminished the importance of this legisla-
tive flaw somewhat by suggesting under the proportionality prong that
deference to congressional judgment was not generally predicated on
the state of the legislative record. Instead, it derives from "due regard
for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide."'71
In this case, Congress was not the body constitutionally appointed to
decide the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. Its role was not to
define the provision's substantive content, but to remediate violations.
Congress's obligation was to confine itself to redressing the wrongs
that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit. Absent
such proportionality between the supposed remedial or preventive ob-
jective and the scope of the legislation, there is a danger that congres-
sional action will cross the line and enact "substantive" laws.
The Court determined that RFRA was not confined to its sup-
posed remedial objective. It again made the point by contrast with the
Voting Rights cases. The legislative measures at issue in the Voting
Rights cases were cabined in a variety of ways-by geography, class of
67. 521 U.S. at 520.
68. See 521 U.S. at 530 ("The appropriateness of remedial measures must be consid-
ered in light of the evil presented.") (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308).
69. See id.
70. See idL ("The absence of more recent episodes stems from the fact that, as one
witness testified, 'deliberate persecution is not the usual problem in this country."') (cita-
tion omitted).
71. Id. at 531 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 207 (opinion of Harlan, J.)).
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effected law, and time.72 Moreover, RFRA explicitly rejected
Supreme Court precedent by imposing the "compelling interest" test
on challenged state laws.73 This statutory usurpation ensured that
state laws valid under Smith would be adjudged unconstitutional
under RFRA. Rather than exhibiting the sort of measured encroach-
ment that characterized the Voting Rights Cases, RFRA clumsily dis-
placed state laws of "every description and regardless of subject
matter.
74
In conclusion, the Court reiterated that costs imposed by RFRA
far exceeded any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct and
in any event, the statute subverted the proper balance of competen-
cies defined for the legislative and judicial branches. The Court's role
is to define the Constitution, and RFRA tried to subvert that role by
altering the meaning of one of the Court's decisions.
I1. Applying Boerne's Horizontal Vision: Civics 101
A. City of Boerne As a Separation of Powers Decision
Separation of powers is properly understood as a political con-
cept rather than a technical rule of law.75 As a general matter the
Supreme Court has treated it as such,76 with the result that there is no
body of law or set of rules designated as "separation of powers" cases,
but rather an imprecise vigilance regarding the impropriety of blend-
72. See id. (Describing limiting aspects of voting rights legislation: The laws challenged
in those cases were confined to regions of the country that had proved most intractably
racist, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315, contained termination dates, see
id. at 331, or were limited to attacking literacy tests - a particularly notorious means of
abridging the right to vote, see Morgan, 384 U.S. 641; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112).
73. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
74. IdL at 532. Importantly, the Court subsumed its concern for congressional intru-
sion on state prerogatives under its proportionality analysis. See id- at 532-36; infra part
III.A. (discussing precedential importance of this analytic structure).
75. See I ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 33, at § 3.12, 352 (noting that the concept
of separation of powers is rooted in the political theory of Locke and Montesquieu and
that even as applied does not yield clear solutions to intergovernmental disputes); see also
BERNARD BAiLYN, Tim IDEOLOGICAL ORmNS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55-93
(1967).
76. But see Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 673 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing for a rule that would invalidate delega-
tions of legislative authority if they assigned too much discretion, but noting that "[t]he
rule against delegation of legislative power is not, however, so cardinal of principle as to
allow for no exception"). "That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the presi-
dent is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government ordained by the Constitution." Id. (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649, 692 (1892)); The Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1812).
ing the branches' distinct functions.77 The Court has granted to itself
the role of referee in ensuring that the founders' system of checks and
balances limits the overlap of governmental functions.78 This role is
exemplified by Marbury v. Madison,79 in which the Court definitively
stated as a first principle of constitutional law that our government is
one of "defined and limited" powers and ruled that the Court was
responsible for ensuring proper execution of this constitutional vision.
Boerne reaffirms Marbury. The opinion opens and closes with
quotations from Marbury, and the thought of Chief Justice Marshall
imbues most of what is in between. Marbury's essential point is that
the judicial branch retains the role of final arbiter as to the meaning of
constitutional provisions.8" Although the Boerne Court engaged in a
false exegesis in suggesting that "the design of the Amendment and
the text of section 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress
has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's restrictions on the States,"'" it is nonetheless true that legisla-
tion which "alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be
said to be enforcing the Clause.' '82
77. See 1 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 33, at 353 (justifying decision not to present
separation of powers cases as a unit in treatise on grounds that "there is no fruitful rule or
test which governs decisions relating to separation of powers").
78. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686-96 (1988) (summarizing judicial enforce-
ment of separation of powers). But see JnssE H. CHOPER, JuDicAl. REvIEw AND THE
NATIONAL PoLr-cAL PRocEss: A FUNCrIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF TiE ROLE OF THE
Sui'a-mF COURT (1980) (advocating that separation of powers issues be deemed
nonjusticiable).
79. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
80. See Texas Assoc. of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 165
(5th Cir. 1985) ("The judicial branch is, of course, the final arbiter of the constitutionality
of a statute.").
81. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
82. Id at 519. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment says nothing, as a matter of
logic, about whether Congress has the power to alter the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause. Based on nothing more than the language of the amendment, the Court could
have decided that Congress, in addition to itself, has the authority to declare the meaning
of due process, privileges and immunities, or equal protection. See Chemerinsky, supra
note 38, at 607-08 (remarking that there is nothing intrinsic to the word "enforce" that
would support the Court's interpretation); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Ex-
trajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. Rnv. 1359, 1377-78 n.80 (1997) (sug-
gesting that there is no real structural reason that Congress or the executive cannot
determine the contours of their own power). While the Court is obviously correct to state
that defining the substantive meaning of the provisions contained in section 1 is distinct
from enforcing those provisions, there is no logical reason that enforcement of those provi-
sions precludes definition of them; the same party could do both, or two parties could
divide the tasks. It was not the "design of the Amendment" that prohibited Congress from
giving substance of the provisions of section 1, but rather the structure of our system of
governance. The text of the amendment only seems inconsistent with congressional self-
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Despite textual and historical arguments to the contrary, the
Court was completely on target in asserting that, as a matter of main-
stream constitutional jurisprudence, "Congress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is."83 But that observa-
tion merely begs the same question left over after Morgan and Mitch-
ell-how does one discern when Congress is changing a right, and
thereby overstepping the limits of its power, and merely enforcing a
right, albeit through prophylactic means?'
The test set forth in Katzenbach v. Morgan provided a formula-
tion to be applied in assessing whether congressional exercise of its
section 5 power is constitutionally propitious." In Boerne, however,
the Court did not mention this test.8 6 Its predictable appearance in
decisions interpreting Boerne makes the absence from the original
case all the more conspicuous. At one extreme, the court in Keeton v.
Univ. of Nev. Sys. resolved the question of whether the ADEA was a
permissible exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforce-
ment power by subjecting it to the Morgan test with no mention of
Boerne.87 At the other extreme, the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. North
Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles does not mention the Morgan
test, but relies exclusively on Boerne, and primarily on the less signifi-
definition because familiarity has disposed us to reject that interpretation. See Kenneth L.
Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections on Lukumi, 69 TUL. L. REv.
335, 345 (1994) (observing that 'the normative power of the factual' reinforces naturalness
of existing state of affairs. Quoting from GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEMnE STAATSLE1RE
338 (1922)).
83. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520; see also Plant v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,219-
25 (1995) (detailing revolutionary-era concerns about intermingling of judicial and legisla-
tive functions). An alternate way of thinking about Boerne's holding has been suggested
by Professor Jackson, who reads Boerne together with Plaut to establish the rule that Con-
gress must afford weight to Article III determinations in the same manner that courts ob-
serve stare decisis. See Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of
Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts-Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86
GEO. L.J. 2445, 2469 (1998). On this view, Congress may have disagreed with Smith, but
would have had to recognize its strong precedential force.
84. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (commenting that distinction be-
tween "interpretation" and "enforcement" is not so obvious).
85. See supra note 34 (stating test).
86. The validity of test was impliedly called into question in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226, 261-63 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) and Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
466-69 (1991), in which members of the Court expressed uncertainty as to whether the
ADEA could be considered a proper exercise of Congress' section 5 powers. See infra part
III.B.1. However, the Boerne Court failed to reference either of these opinions.
87. See 150 F.3d 1055, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the ADEA was "aimed at
ending the arbitrary, discriminatory government conduct that the Equal Protection Clause
targets"); see also Jolliffe v. Mitchell, 986 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Va. 1997) (finding that Family
Medical Leave Act was proper enforcement of Equal Protection Clause and thus abro-
gated Eleventh Amendment immunity but failing to mention Boerne).
cant but more ideologically resonant federalism aspects of that opin-
ion.s8 In any event, measuring the "appropriateness" of congressional
power against the end of enforcing equal protection at worst dero-
gates from traditional separation of powers between Congress and the
courts by substituting the intuition of the courts for Congressional
factfinding, and at best is vague. 9 This formulation does nothing to
resolve the question of "enforcement" versus "interpretation."
Although the congruence and proportionality test outlined in Boerne
provided additional guidance to lower courts attempting to ascertain
that line,90 this test also failed to delineate the congressional role in
identifying equal protection violations. This leaves two choices con-
cerning the congressional role. Congress either does or does not have
a role in ascertaining constitutional violations. Each possibility is con-
sidered in turn.
B. City of Boerne and Its Discontents: Problems in Application
1. Simple Problems: The Difference Between Judicial Review and
Congressional Power
Reading Boerne in light of the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida,91 states have asserted that claims may no longer be
brought against them under antidiscrimination laws such as the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act92 and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act.93 Their argument holds that because a group has not been
accorded heightened scrutiny under Supreme Court equal protection
jurisprudence, Congress is helpless to enact legislation to protect that
group under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus the challenged statu-
tory schemes can only be a product of Congress' Commerce Clause
powers. Under the holding of Seminole Tribe of Fla., Congress may
88. See 166 F.3d 698, 705-08 (4th Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, C.J.).
89. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.
90. See supra notes 67-74 (describing congruence and proportionality test).
91. 517 U.S. 43 (1996).
92. See, e.g., Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997).
93. See, e.g., Humenansky v. University of Minnesota, 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting claim of congressional power to abrogate state immunity); Kimel v. State of Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998) (same, but also affirming congressional
power to abrogate state immunity via the ADA). States have raised similar claims with
respect to the Fair Labor Standards Act, see Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997)
(rejecting claim of congressional power to abrogate state immunity), the Equal Pay Act,
see Larry v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 975 F. Supp. 1447 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (re-
jecting claim of congressional power to abrogate state immunity), and the Individuals With
Disabilities in Education Act, see Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 1999 WL 673228, at
*1 (August 31, 1999) (holding that Congress did not have authority to pass IDEA under
Fourteenth Amendment).
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not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity94 pursuant to its Com-
merce Clause power,95 but may do so only when exercising its en-
forcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.96
The result is that plaintiffs cannot defeat a claim of state sovereign
immunity unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity 7
Courts have not generally been receptive to this argument. With
respect to the ADEA, six of the eight circuit courts which have ad-
dressed the issue in light of Boeme have found the statute a valid ex-
ercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers. 98 With respect to
the ADA, three of five courts have reached the same conclusion.99
Dissenting courts'00 have relied on the following straightforward syllo-
94. See supra note 14, referring to the 11th Amendment.
95. See 517 U.S. at 66-67 (overturning Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989)).
96. See id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976)). In Union
Gas, a plurality of the Court concluded that Congress may abrogate states' immunity from
suit when legislating pursuant to the plenary powers granted it by Article I the Constitu-
tion. See 491 U.S. at 19. In Fitzpatrick, the Court had reasoned that since the Fourteenth
Amendment postdated the Eleventh Amendment and since it was specifically intended to
limit state sovereignty, Congress could "provide for private suits against States or state
officials" when it exercised legislative authority pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 427 U.S. at 456 (Rehnquist, J.) ("When Congress acts pursuant to section 5,
not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitu-
tional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amend-
ment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority."). In
rejecting the reasoning of Union Gas, the Court noted that Fitzpatrick cannot be read to
justify "limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment through appeal
to antecedent provisions of the Constitution." 517 U.S. at 66 (citation omitted).
97. A state may waive its immunity and thereby subject itself to suit in federal court.
See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238. The restrictions in Seminole
Tribe have precipitated interesting arguments concerning waiver. See Kit Kinports, Im-
plied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REv. 793 (1998) (arguing that even after
Seminole Tribe Congress can use its Article I powers to condition federal monies or state
participation in a federal program on waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Abril v.
Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 189 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Virginia waived Elev-
enth Amendment immunity by continuing to operate facilities after passage of FLSA).
98. See Cooper v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 162 F.3d 770 (2nd Cir.
1998); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998); Coger v. Board of Regents, 154
F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 1998); Keeton v. University of Nevada System, 150 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir.
1998); Scott v. University of Mississippi, 148 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 1998); Goshtasby v. Board
of Trustees, 141 F.3d 761 (1998); but see Humenansky v. Board of Regents, 152 F.3d 822
(8th Cir. 1998); Kimel v. State of Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998).
99. See Coolbaugh v. State of La., 136 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1998); Clark v. California, 123
F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997); Kimel v. State of Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir.
1998); but see Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 1999WL 521709, at *1 (8th Cir. July 23, 1999);
Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
100. See Coolbaugh, 136 F.3d at 439-40 (Smith, J., dissenting); Garrett v. Bd. of Trust-
ees, 989 F.Supp. 1409, 1410 (N.D. Ala. 1998) ("Congress cannot stretch section 5 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to force a state to provide alleg-
VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL TENSIONS
gism. Major premise: equal protection' 01 only extends to suspect or
quasi-suspect classes.' 02 Minor premise: neither the disabled nor the
aged are a suspect or quasi-suspect class under Supreme Court prece-
dent. 03 Conclusion: equal protection cannot be the source of con-
gressional power to pass legislation benefiting individuals who are
members of those classes.' 0
4
edly equal treatment by guaranteeing special treatment or accommodation for disabled
persons....").
101. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state
may deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. See U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV. This rule "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985). Of course, the government can treat persons differently if they are not "simi-
larly situated." The equal protection guarantee only prohibits intentional governmental
discrimination. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (explaining the state
action is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact);
United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 99-100 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 516 U.S. 927 (1995) (sus-
taining constitutionality of sentencing disparity between cocaine base and cocaine powder
based on an equal protection challenge).
102. "Suspect" classifications receive strict, or very searching, judicial scrutiny. Under
the strict scrutiny test the government must demonstrate a compelling need for the differ-
ent treatment and show that the provision in question is narrowly tailored to achieve its
objective. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). Strict scrutiny is often said
to be strict in theory, but fatal in fact, meaning that courts invariably strike legislation
distinguishing between people on the basis of a suspect classification. See Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). But see
Adarand v. Pena, 500 U.S. 200,237 (1995) (stating that government can satisfy compelling
interest test, given persistence of race-based discrimination).
"Quasi-suspect" classifications receive intermediate, or moderately searching, judicial
scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must at least demonstrate that the
classification is substantially related to an important governmental objective. See United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
103. The suspect or quasi-suspect classes that are entitled to heightened scrutiny have
been limited to groups generally defined by their status, such as race, national ancestry or
ethnic origin, alienage, gender and illegitimacy. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. In addition,
courts apply strict scrutiny if the challenged legislation infringes upon a fundamental right.
See id.
104. As a general rule, the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution is satisfied
when the government differentiates between persons for a reason that bears a rational
relationship to an appropriate governmental interest. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320
(1993). The rational-basis standard is a very forgiving one. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S.
93, 97 (1979) ("[Clourts are quite reluctant to overturn governmental action on the ground
that it denies equal protection of the laws."). Due largely to the theoretical difficulties
posed by the institution of judicial review over majoritarian legislative judgments, courts
abjure from "sit[ting] as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legisla-
tive policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed
along suspect lines." City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). "[T]he
Constitution presumes that, as long as the groups involved have a fair chance to fight in the
political arena, the democratic process will right itself." Beach Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 959 F.2d 975, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Mikva, C.J., concurring). However, the govern-
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For example, in Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehi-
cles,105 the district court stated that in ascertaining the limits of Con-
gress' Fourteenth Amendment power, "[t]he question becomes
whether Congress is legislating to protect a class cognizable under sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. If not, even if it explicitly in-
vokes it, Congress may not ground its action on the Fourteenth
Amendment." 106 Similarly, Judge Cox in Kimel would hold that be-
cause the disabled and aged are not a suspect class, congressional
power to legislate on their behalf under the Fourteenth Amendment is
severely circumscribed.107 The analysis contained in these and similar
decisions relies on two erroneous propositions. The first is that equal
protection jurisprudence is confined to suspect or quasi-suspect classi-
fications. The second assumption is that the Boerne test does not ask
whether the legislative intent is remedial or preventative, but only
whether the benefiting group is one subject to heightened scrutiny.
Neither proposition finds support in Boerne.
A more faithful reading of Boerne suggests not that the Court will
dismiss out of hand any legislation on behalf of non-suspect groups,
but rather that Congress must establish the factual basis for its deci-
sions. This model holds that Congress may legislate on behalf of
groups subject to rational basis judicial review, since even under this
less searching inquiry, the state may still be found to engage in uncon-
stitutional conduct.'08 The Court has stated as much with respect to
both the aged and disabled. In the case of each group, while height-
ened judicial scrutiny was determined not to be warranted, the Court
stated that group members held the same right as all others to not be
treated unequally-that is, in an arbitrary and irrational manner.'0 9
ment still may not discriminate on a basis that is invidious, arbitrary or irrational. See
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 (1980).
105. 987 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.N.C. 1997), affd 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999). On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed largely on federalism grounds. See infra part III.B.2 (discuss-
ing Brown decision). In so doing, it explicitly recognized that the heightened-scrutiny ar-
gument is based on an erroneous assumption. See 166 F.3d at 706 ("It is true, of course,
that even rational basis review places limitations on states that Congress may seek to
enforce.").
106. Id. at 457.
107. See 139 F.3d 1426, 1447, 1449 (11th Cir. 1998).
108. See Note, Elizabeth Welter, The ADA's Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment State
Immunity as a Valid Exercise of Congress's Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,
82 MlnN. L. REv. 1139, 1161 (1998) (explaining difference between judicial and legislative
practices under Fourteenth Amendment).
109. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) ("The
state may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated
as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational."); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 471 (1979).
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As Judge Posner artfully explained in an opinion addressing the
issue, the scope of congressional power thus turns not on whether a
classification is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, but on whether,
at least sometimes, state action based on such a classification results in
unconstitutional conduct." 0 "Because the aged [and disabled] are not
as vulnerable as certain other groups, such as blacks, they are not enti-
tled to have their claims of discrimination evaluated under the gener-
ous (to plaintiffs) standard of 'strict scrutiny.""' Nonetheless, Judge
Posner explained, the Supreme Court had, in City of Cleburne, invali-
dated the denial of a permit for a home for mentally retarded persons
as founded on "'irrational prejudice against the mentally re-
tarded.""' 2 The Court's decision in Cleburne established that equal
protection arguments are available not only to groups eligible for
heightened protection under previous decisions, but also to groups,
such as the aged and disabled, who are subjected to invidious
discrimination." 3
While the equation of heightened scrutiny with equal protection
doctrine as a whole simply misreads applicable equal protection pre-
cedent, a second mistake conflates a level of judicial review with the
scope of congressional power." 4 Heightened scrutiny is a judicial, not
110. See Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1998).
111. 1&. at 392.
112. Id. (quoting 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)).
113. See also Goshtasby v. University of Ill., 141 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The
Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence is not confined to traditional suspect or
quasi-suspect classifications.") (citing Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1997)). Had
the Court intended Boerne to stand for the proposition that Congress' section 5 power is
limited to protecting only those classes of individuals entitled to heightened levels of judi-
cial scrutiny, it would have been an odd choice to highlight South Carolina v. Katzenbach, a
decision that upheld the suspension of literacy tests despite an earlier ruling validating such
tests as constitutional. See 521 U.S. at 519 (citing 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)). Similarly, it is
worth noting that at the time of the unanimous decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 445, permitting Congress to abrogate state immunity pursuant to the 1972 Amend-
ments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which subjected state governments to
liability for discriminating in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin, it was not at all clear that gender was subject to a heightened level of scrutiny.
Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying "intermediate" scrutiny to gender
claims in a case decided 6 months after Fitzpatrick) with Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13,
17 (1975) (striking statute under either rational basis or strict scrutiny on Equal Protection
claim). It is evident from these decisions that the Supreme Court permits Congress to pass
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment even though the state action proscribed by
the legislative enactment would not itself constitute a violation of Equal Protection. See
also Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the plaintiffs had not
"proved a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment").
114. See, e.g., Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1447 (Cox, J.).
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a legislative, framework. 115 Though courts apply heightened scrutiny
only when certain circumstances prevail,116 Congress is free to scruti-
nize a problem as carefully as it wishes. In determining whether an
enactment is remedial or preventative in nature, Congress has virtu-
ally unlimited discretion to investigate facts. This distinction is crucial
in the context of antidiscrimination statutes such as the ADEA and
ADA, since Congress' ability to identify unconstitutional state action
permits it to act where rational basis review would prohibit a court
from identifying a violation. The Boerne Court recognized this con-
gressional role, reaffirming the Morgan Court's observation that
broad congressional power permits Congress to do more than codify
the Court's earlier decisions. 1 7 Thus our first possibility - that of
Congress playing no role in redressing equal protection violations -
is supported neither by equal protection doctrine nor Boerne itself.
2. Advanced Problems: The Difference Between Constitutional
Interpretation and Factfinding
An alternative reading of Boerne is that Congress does play a role
in redressing violations of equal protection. The question then be-
comes how to determine the boundaries of its power within that role?
There are a number of possible answers. The first possibility, rejected
above, is that Congress must restrict itself to legislating on behalf of
judicially protected classes. A second possibility, rejected by Boerne,
is that Congress has free reign to alter the constitutional standard of
review under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 A third possibility is
that Congress cannot redefine judicial standards of review, yet retains
some capacity to legislate on behalf of protected classes. The question
begged by this third possibility is how to devise a limiting principle so
that Congress may recognize and redress widespread discrimination
against the aged and disabled, yet not have free reign to simply con-
clude that any particular perceived problem warrants remedial legisla-
tion that can be enforced against the states.
115. See Welter, supra note 108 at 1161.
116. See supra notes 101-107 and accompanying text (stating equal protection doctrine).
That doctrine stems from the Court's recognition, in United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), that the presence of certain circumstances creates a pre-
sumption that liberal democratic norms are being violated.
117. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518-19 (noting that congressional power extends beyond
violations already identified by the Court); supra note 33 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing this aspect of Morgan).
118. For example, Congress could not apply strict scrutiny where the Court has deter-
mined only rational-basis should apply.
Boerne itself suggests one such check. The congruence prong re-
quires a tight fit between the alleged social misconduct and the pro-
posed remedy. Using this analysis, the judiciary can ensure that an
intractable or renegade Congress does not overstep the boundaries of
permissible legislative action. To apply the congruence test, the Court
checks the factual basis for Congress' actions. If, as with Boerne, the
factual predicates for action are unsupported or suspect, the Court
might rightfully conclude that Congress is simply attempting to alter
the level of judicial review. If, on the other hand, the verisimilitude of
Congress' factfinding is satisfactory, the Court should uphold the re-
sultant legislation, so long as it is proportional to the problem to be
redressed. This is not to say that courts should be credulous; rather,
that in assessing congressional factfinding, the judiciary should keep in
mind relative institutional competencies.
Courts traditionally accord a great deal of deference to congres-
sional determinations based on the unique capacity to find facts."19
On an intuitive level, this makes sense. While judges live removed
from the concerns that animate life in the more democratic branches,
Congress and the Executive are exquisitely responsive institutions. 2 °
Moreover, characteristics of institutional structure allow Congress to
allocate significant time and resources to the evaluation of problems
that come to its attention, presumptively at the behest of its constitu-
ents. Thus, Professor Cox has argued that due to Congress' superior
factfinding capacity, its interpretation of what constitutes equal pro-
tection should not be second guessed.' 2' Boerne supports this view, in
a modified form. Justice Kennedy rescued Morgan's second rationale
from appearing as an unconstitutional "ratchet theory" by reading it
as a factual conclusion on the part of Congress that the situation with
respect to literacy tests did fall within the rubric of equal protection
119. The "uniqueness" of this institutional capacity has been challenged. See Saul
Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer To Con-
gressional Factflnding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 No=n DAME L. Rnv.
337, 362 (1984) ("[Biased on currently available procedures for finding and evaluating
facts, neither branch of government has an absolute claim to factfinding superiority.").
Pilchen argues that while Congress does possess unique mechanisms for development of
substantial factual expertise (e.g., the committee system), it also has institutional incentives
to "ignore and distort" facts (e.g., electoral accountability). See id. at 364-69.
120. See Amity Shales, Voucher Program Passes a Test, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1998, at
A18 (noting addition of phrase "the permanent campaign"-denoting increasing reliance
by elected officials on public opinion polls-to the political lexicon).
121. See Archibald Cox, The Supreme Cour 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Ad-
judication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HAgv. L. REv. 91, 104-05 (1966)).
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jurisprudence extant at the time of Morgan.22 Of course, Justice
Kennedy suggested, the Court retained the power to check Congress'
conclusions. 2 This model finds considerable support in the relevant
equal protection case law.
a. Factfinding: The Political Check
It is in part due to Congress' superior capacity to investigate com-
plex questions of social relations that the Court has declined to extend
heightened judicial protection to the aged and disabled. While the
Court accorded increased judicial scrutiny to discrete and insular mi-
norities who were historic victims of state sponsored prejudice, it
eventually limited application of that doctrine on the notion that more
diffuse groups should be able to utilize the political branches in order
to vindicate rights.124 This is not to say that the disabled and aged do
not share key attributes with traditional "suspect" classifications. As
Professor Tribe has stated, the move away from near-complete defer-
ence of rational-basis review is a judicial response to statutes that cre-
ate "suspect" distinctions but, due to formal aspects of equal
protection analysis, cannot be labeled as such."z Traditionally, suspect
groups faced obstacles to participation in the very same political pro-
cess that produced the laws they challenged. 26 Later cases, such as
City of Cleburne, involved classes of people facing a similar
challenge.127
While the Court refused to accord heightened scrutiny to the
aged or the disabled, in each instance it gave dual assurances that the
groups would not be deprived of equal protection. First, the Court
122. See 521 U.S. at 528 (acknowledging that Morgan could be read to support ratchet
theory but stating "[t]his is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best
one.").
123. See id. (stating that the Morgan Court perceived a factual basis upon which Con-
gress could find invidious discrimination). The importance of the judicial role in checking
congressional passage of unconstitutional laws stems from the instrumental nature of con-
gressional deliberation: Congress is interested in finding the best policy, not the most con-
stitutional one. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 71, 94
(discussing epiphenomenal nature of constitutional considerations in congressional deci-
sion-making).
124. See supra note 101 (stating relevant equal protection doctrine).
125. LAURENCE H. TRIE, Am:RicAN CONSTrrUONAL LAW § 16-3 at 1445 (2d ed.
1988).
126. See id.
127. See Beach Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 959 F.2d 975, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Mikva, J., concurring) (explaining Cleburne and similar rational-basis decisions on incon-
gruity between the Court's desire to protect participation interests and jurisprudential limi-
tations imposed by the tier approach).
deferred to congressional factfinding in determining whether an em-
pirical predicate existed such that discrimination against the aged or
disabled rose to a constitutional dimension. The Court in Cleburne
stated that the question of how the disabled should be treated under
the law is a difficult and technical matter, "very much a task for legis-
lators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-
informed opinions of the judiciary."'" Similarly, the Court in a deci-
sion challenging age-based discrimination stated that the "drawing of
lines that create distinctions is a peculiarly legislative task."' 29 If the
standards of scrutiny applied in equal protection cases were arrived at
"absent controlling congressional direction," the ADEA and ADA
provide that direction.' 30
b. Invidiousness: The Linguistic Check
Second, the Court assured the disabled and the aged that mean-
ingful judicial review of invidious (arbitrary or irrational) state deci-
sions would be sufficient to protect them from unjustified unequal
treatment. The term "invidious" simply refers to discrimination that is
offensive. 131 In City of Cleburne, the Court defined "invidious" by
reference to the terms "arbitrary" and "irrational."'32 By operational-
izing the equal protection standard in this manner, the Court implic-
itly recognized that the question of equal protection has a tautological
character: discrimination will be deemed offensive if society views the
attribute upon which the disparate treatment is predicated as a largely
illegitimate criterion for drawing distinctions. The lower courts are
participating, then, in a continuing conversation concerning what our
society denominates "invidious."' 3 Importantly - for this amelio-
rates the tautology - the majoritarian nature of the conversation is
tempered by the rules and values of the liberal democratic system
within which it operates.' 34 The linguistic check implicit in the Court's
128. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443.
129. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per
curiam).
130. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439. The same argument holds for the ADEA. See
infra note 129 (discussing parallels between Cleburne and Murgia opinions).
131. "Invidious" is defined as "discrimination that is offensive or provokes resentment
or ill will." THE AmERi AN HERiTAGE DicIONARY (New College ed. 1976).
132. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
133. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2315 n.2 (1998)
("Constitutional doctrine is both a reflection of the demand for social equality and a means
of blunting or avoiding the dismantling of status hierarchies.").
134. See G. EDWARD Wre=r, THE AMERcAN JuDIcIL TRADmoN 154 (1976)
(describing how tension between counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review and the
necessity of ensuring that government did not undermine basic tenets of philosophical lib-
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definition is reinforced by a normative check based on the values un-
derlying our collective political philosophy.
An example illustrates the importance of these checks. Suppose
a renegade Congress decides to impose strict equality on participants
in collegiate athletics at public universities.135 After holding hearings
on the matter, Congress decides that the bias in athletics toward phys-
ically skilled persons constitutes invidious discrimination, and accord-
ingly passes legislation requiring public universities to offer athletic
scholarships in equal numbers to physically diminutive students. The
example suggests that judges should not trust Congress to limit appli-
cation of the term invidious to conduct conventionally deemed
offensive.136
Due to the stated checks, such an event would never come to
pass. The first line of defense to renegade legislation of this type is
linguistic. Participation in athletics requires a particular set of charac-
teristics and skills, including size, speed, agility, and a tolerance for
pain. Providing hockey or football scholarships on the basis of such
skills is hardly arbitrary or irrational. More important, however, is the
political check. Denial of the opportunity to attend school free of
charge on the basis of athletic skill is not deemed "invidious" because
we have collectively determined that there is nothing unjust about it.
That is, the awarding of athletic scholarships is not the type of irra-
tional or arbitrary prejudice deemed incompatible with a democratic
system.
Of course, invidiousness is a highly subjective concept. What one
person deems offensive another will term merely harmless or humor-
ous.'37 The linguistic and philosophical checks combine to cabin this
eralism yielded an equal protection jurisprudence that carefully reviewed for infringement
of liberal democratic values).
135. This example is taken from a question posed at oral argument in the en banc re-
hearing of Autio v. Minnesota, 157 F.3d 1141 (1998).
136. The example also represents a strong version of the notion that antidiscrimination
law requires equality of result, as opposed to equality of opportunity. See MICHEL Rosu--
FELD, AFFmmATrvn AcTbON AND JusncE: A PILOSOPpMCAL AND CONsTITUTIONAL IN-
QUIRY 158-59 (1991) (suggesting that Supreme Court decisions favoring equality of
opportunity at the expense of equality of result are consistent with American ideology).
The prevailing perspective refuses to see the political playing field as anything but level for
all would-be participants. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality
and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. Rlv. 1133, 1151 (1993) (book review)
(observing that "equality of opportunity" builds in a background of unstated assumptions
that confer a consistent advantage in "all the competitions that matter").
137. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Sociology of the Hate Speech Debate, 37 VL. L.
Rlv. 805, 815-16 (1992) (noting and dismissing argument that hate speech is not really
harmful, but merely offensive); see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,
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variability in definition. While individual members of Congress might
assert that a particular form of invidious behavior warrants passage of
legislation designed to prevent or remediate the discrimination, the
majoritarian nature of that institution acts as a check on members who
may be apologists for a position that falls outside mainstream (social
and philosophical) definitions of offensiveness.13  Despite the pres-
ence of these checks on congressional power, recent decisions have
called into question the entire enterprise of judicial deference to con-
gressional factfinding.
C. Does Boeme Mean That Kimel Is Like Lopez?
The recent line of federalism-based decisions suggests that the
Court's project of enforcing its conception of a limited role for federal
government has superceded the traditional judicial deference to con-
gressional factfinding. While Boerne's "congruence and proportional-
ity" test ostensibly concerns the requisite nexus between factual
predicates and the scope of congressional action, the Fourth Circuit in
Brzonkala139 recognized that Boerne also implicitly operates as a
Fourteenth Amendment analogue to United States v. Lopez.14 ° In
each case the Court concerned itself with devising a test to ensure
against congressional overreaching into arenas not described by the
relevant constitutional text.'4 ' Neither the Commerce Clause nor the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court implied, serves as a general police
power permitting Congress to remedy all and sundry social
problems. 42 At a slightly higher level of abstraction, in each case the
Court implied that it would use its role as final arbiter of all matters
constitutional to curtail what it viewed as congressional intrusion into
1486 (3rd Cir. 1990) (noting that although men might find obscenity and pornography in
the workplace harmless, women might find it highly offensive, thereby creating a hostile
work environment).
138. That is to say, at any point in time there will be a generally accepted, or main-
stream, consensus about the parameters of disability, within which differences will exist.
The reductio ad absurdum argument fails then, because the overlapping assumptions
shared throughout interpretive communities will ensure that extreme positions fail. See
Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory
Interpretation, 65 S. CA- L. RFv. 2505, 2544, 2548 (1992) (discussing how perspectives
common to those of similar backgrounds and circumstances shape interpretations and
moral conclusions).
139. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 92-93 (4th
Cir. 1999).
140. 514 U.S. 549 (1994).
141. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518-19; see also, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
142. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519; see also, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57.
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matters better left to the states. 4 3 It is a substantial understatement
to say that this strong judicial enforcement of limited federal govern-
ment represents a jurisprudential shift.
Congress has often relied on strong factual predicates to support
controversial enactments. At the dawn of the New Deal, the Court
refused to enact Roosevelt's programs on the ground that the legisla-
tion overstepped the bounds of congressional power. 1' Later, how-
ever, a more compliant Court acceded in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,45 upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 as
a valid exercise of Congress' commerce power. The Court later reaf-
firmed and expanded this power in United States v. Darby,'146 uphold-
ing the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. In each instance, the Court
relied heavily on legislative histories that took pains to establish a
nexus-termed a "substantial relation"-between the legislation and
interstate commerce. 47 While not simply deferring to congressional
findings, the Court in each case "seemed satisfied that Congress had
developed adequate factual support for the linkage between the statu-
tory scheme and interstate commerce.' 48 As the type of legislation
validated under the Commerce Clause became less "unprece-
dented,"' 49 the Court by degree abandoned any pretense of scrutiniz-
ing legislation passed under the Commerce Clause, upholding against
constitutional challenge an array of enactments supported by "con-
gressional fact-findings stress[ing] that the regulation ... was neces-
sary to abate a cumulative evil affecting national commerce.5 s°
Conventional wisdom places the logical extreme of this free pass ap-
proach to judicial review in Wickard v. Filburne,'5' in which the Court
ruled that private use of wheat sufficiently affects interstate commerce
143. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529, 536; see also, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552, 564.
144. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
145. See 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1936).
146. See 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
147. See NRLB, 301 U.S. at 37.
148. Phillip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Ad-
judication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE WEST. RES. L. REv. 695, 699 (1995).
149. Pilchen, supra note 119, at 341.
150. TRINE, supra note 125, § 5-5 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Frickey notes that the judici-
ary abandoned strict review of Commerce Clause legislation to the extent that "it would
have been a waste of public resources to assign a... government attorney [the task of
writing a brief in support of the legislation]." Frickey, supra note 148, at 699.
151. 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
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in the aggregate to support regulation of wheat crops under the Agri-
culture Adjustment Act of 1938.152
More recently, however, the Court has reversed course. In Lo-
pez, 53 the Supreme Court indicated that it would no longer blithely
assume that an enactment was supportable as an exercise of the com-
merce power. At least one court has identified Boerne as a Four-
teenth Amendment analogue to Lopez." 4 And it is true that the
Court's new hands-off attitude highlights a longstanding tension that
152. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (stating that "Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wick-
ard ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previ-
ously defined authority of Congress under that Clause."); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
196 n.27 (1968) (stating that "Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as
an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities"), overruled on other
grounds by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (5-4 decision), over-
ruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Pro-
fessor Chen characterizes the view of Wickard as "the high-water mark of the New Deal's
constitutional revolution" and "the great Satan" of "radical federalism's jihad" as a
"myth." Jim Chen, Filburn's Forgotten Footnote - Of Farm Team Federalism and Its Fate,
82 MnN. L. REv. 249, 277, 279 (1998) (noting that "[l]aw can turn even outrageous myth
into history through a sufficiently persistent pattern of citations"). Professor Chen notes
that even by its own terms, Wickard added little to Commerce Clause jurisprudence; the
"aggregation" argument for expatiating a bushel of wheat into incidence of interstate com-
merce had originated the previous Term in Darby. See id. at 280 & n.213 (quoting Darby,
312 U.S. at 123 ("[I]n present day industry, competition by a small part may affect the
whole and... the total effect of the competition of many small producers may be great.")).
153. At the margins, responses have suggested that Lopez was merely a judicial repri-
mand to a Congress grown complacent due to indifferent judicial review of legislation, see
Suzanna Sherry, The Barking Dog, 46 CASE W. Ras. L. Rnv. 677, 677 (1996) (comparing
Lopez to a dog that must occasionally bite someone in order to be taken seriously);
Deborah Jones Merritt, Reflections on United States v. Lopez: Commercel, 94 Micn. L.
Rav. 674, 712 (1995) (expressing view that Court merely intended to encourage Congress
to take federalism more seriously, not significantly alter degree of deference afforded con-
gressional legislative judgments), or that it represented a harbinger of an activist Court
determined to return federal-state relations to a pre-New Deal equilibrium, Mark Tushnet,
Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 845, 869-75 (1995) (suggesting that Lopez may be precursor to significant change in
doctrine of governmental structure); Calabresi, supra note 21, at 752 (describing Lopez as
"revolutionary"); see also Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution For Anyway: Of History
and Theory, Bruce Ackerman, and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. Rca. L. REv. 885, 885 (1996)
("So which is it? Is Lopez a sport, a judicial shot across the bow to remind Congress to
take its responsibilities seriously? Or have the ghosts of Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter,
and McReynolds returned to haunt us after all?"). Though it is difficult to tease apart the
degree to which the trend was supported by assumptions regarding institutional compe-
tence or by structural separation-of-powers considerations, it is clear that to some degree
the Court relied on Congress's fact-finding role as at least a rhetorical justification for an
almost complete abandonment of searching review.
154. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 826 (4th
Cir. 1999). A simple response to this argument is that the Fourteenth Amendment is quali-
tatively different from the Commerce Clause because its purpose was to vindicate specific
societal norms that require enforcement. See infra part III.
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seemed to reach full-blown paradox in Boerne. On the one hand, the
Court repeatedly intones rhetoric suggesting that Congress need not
"make particularized findings in order to legislate."' 55 On the other,
the Court appears to require facts, or at least the appearance of facts,
in order to support Congressional determinations, a position perhaps
best reflected in the "rational basis" test sometimes invoked by the
Court. 56 Courts have selectively read this jurisprudential shift to in-
dicate that the judiciary may properly second guess Congress, even
when Congress is acting "within its sphere of power and
responsibilities.' '1 57
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents represents one such deci-
sion. 58 In that case, a badly divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit
determined that state-government defendants are immune from suit
under the ADEA, but not immune from suit under the ADA. Judge
Edmondson, writing for the court, held only that the ADEA did not
evince the necessary "unmistakable" clarity of intent to abrogate state
immunity, while the ADA did express such congressional intent. 59
Judge Cox additionally reached the question of congressional power
155. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971). See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562
("Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens
that an activity has on interstate commerce."); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299
(1964) ("[N]o formal findings were made, which of course are not necessary.").
156. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 303 ("Of course, the mere fact that Congress has said
when particular activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further
examination by this Court. But where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and
testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme neces-
sary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.").
157. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
158. 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, __ U.S. ___ 119 S.Ct. 901 (1999)
(granting certiorari only as to questions concerning constitutionality of ADEA as against
states).
159. See 139 F.3d at 1430, 1432-33 n.14. Based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), Judge Edmundson's conclusion appears correct.
The Dellmuth Court required total absence of ambiguity. Because the language of the
ADEA is susceptible to more than one inference, it would not meet the "unmistakably
clear" test as applied in Dellmuth. 491 U.S. at 226-27. However, the correctness of Judge
Edmundson's conclusion as a technical matter only highlights the incorrigible nature of the
Court's super clear-statement requirement. Congress found, on a separate inquiry, that
the arbitrary usage of age as a proxy for ability prevalent in the private sector also posed
problems in the public sector. See EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1982)
(explaining that when Congress passed the ADEA in 1967, it only applied to private em-
ployers; in 1974, after hearings, Congress amended the ADEA to apply to public employ-
ers). Given the clarity of congressional purpose, for the Court to insist that Congress
continually revisit such decisions in order to contemplate yet again their effect on state
sovereignty is "exceptionally countermajoritarian" and somewhat condescending. See Wil-
liam N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 595, 639 (1992).
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and concluded that Congress lacked the ability to enact the ADEA
pursuant to its section 5 enforcement powers. Judge Hatchett dis-
sented from this view, opining that both the ADEA and ADA not
only expressed the requisite intent, but were permissible enactments
under the Fourteenth Amendment.160 Thus, the court split on the is-
sue of the respective statutes' applicability vis-a-vis the states, decid-
ing that the ADA does apply, while the ADEA does not. In
subjecting the statutes to analysis under Boerne, both Judges Cox and
Hatchett read that decision's congruence and proportionality test as a
gloss on Morgan. Nonetheless, the judges reached very different con-
clusions concerning the extent of Congress' enforcement powers.
The contrast between Judge Cox's and Judge Hatchett's opinions
is instructive for present purposes. Judge Cox states the Boerne analy-
sis correctly, but when applying the facts to the law, simply reads "pre-
ventative" out of Congress' "preventative and remedial" power.
Additionally, Judge Cox ignores the Boerne Court's clear recognition
that prophylactic legislation will on occasion sweep up into its purview
otherwise constitutional behavior. The Boerne Court repeatedly de-
scribed Congress' power as both remedial and preventative161 and
suggested that in some instances otherwise constitutional conduct may
be swept up by a valid piece of legislation due to the prophylactic
nature of congressional power. 62 Were this not the case, the role of
Congress would be limited to codifying existing decisions. 163 This is
the role Judge Cox apparently envisions for Congress. Relying on a
series of Supreme Court decisions upholding state mandatory retire-
ment laws against equal protection challenge, he determined that the
ADEA impermissibly diverged from the Court's exposition of equal
protection rights. 6 4 On this view, the ADEA is nothing more than a
scrivener's error. Such a conclusion ignores, however, the Court's
160. See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1436.
161. See supra text accompanying note 61 (noting repeated recitation of these terms in
tandem).
162. See supra note 62.
163. See also supra note 34 (quoting language from Morgan to similar effect); see also
139 F.3d at 1446 (Hatchett, J., dissenting in part) (stating that Boerne and the Voting
Rights Cases permit Congress, "if circumstances warrant, [to] tweak procedures, find cer-
tain facts to be presumptively true, and deem certain conduct presumptively
unconstitutional").
164. See 139 F.3d at 1447 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976)).
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clear admonition that line-drawing in creating political protections for
the aged and disabled is a peculiarly legislative task.165
In order for its vision to have any significance, it is necessary that
the Court afford Congress some degree of autonomy in determining
how best to implement the promise of freedom from arbitrary, irra-
tional, or invidious discrimination. Prior to Kimel, Congress has en-
joyed freedom from intensive oversight in fashioning remedial
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. In South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,'6 6 the Court stated that Congress is chiefly responsible
for implementing the rights created under the Civil War Amend-
ments. The Boerne Court reinforced this view, stating that when Con-
gress acts within its sphere of power and responsibility, it has the right
to make its own informed judgments as to the meaning of the
Constitution.' 67
Congress' longstanding freedom from intensive oversight com-
ports with the Cleburne (and Boerne) Courts' vision of a relationship
in which Congress and the Court complement each other, rather than
fighting over contested constitutional ground. In Boerne, Congress
was not merely disagreeing with the Court's application of the facts to
the law, but was disagreeing with the law itself. It altered the constitu-
tional standard to be applied. By contrast, the situation with the
ADEA is analogous to the voting rights issue posed by City of Rome
v. United States, the last in the line of Voting Rights Act cases includ-
ing Morgan and South Carolina.'68 In City of Rome, the Court upheld
against constitutional challenge a provision of the Voting Rights Act
that prohibited jurisdictions from changing electoral rules in a manner
that would have a discriminatory impact on a class protected by the
statute, regardless of the motivation animating the changes. As with
the earlier cases, there was a strong argument that, since the Supreme
Court had previously ruled that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits
only intentional discrimination, the legislation exceeded Congress' en-
forcement power. 69 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the provisions on
the ground that the egregious history of voting discrimination sup-
165. See supra part II.B.2.a. (discussing judicial deference to congressional judgments in
line-drawing).
166. 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966). Congress' enforcement power is the same under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See supra note 26.
167. See 521 U.S. at 534.
168. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
169. See supra notes 25-26, 62 and accompanying text (describing parallel situations in
Morgan and South Carolina).
ported over-inclusive legislation designed to remediate and prevent
ongoing intentional discrimination.
City of Rome suggests an analytical model appropriate to the Ki-
mel decision. First, the judicial branch articulates the legal constitu-
tional standard. When legislating, Congress must as an initial matter
establish that it is attempting to enforce that standard. Under the
Equal Protection Clause, for example, Congress is required to show
that it was attempting to remedy or prevent discrimination. Based on
that standard, Congress may rely on its fact-finding capacity in order
to provide a detailed empirical justification for the proposed legisla-
tion. Congress is then accorded substantial deference in its applica-
tion of the facts to the law. The judicial review for "congruence and
proportionality" is, on this view, essentially a review for proximate
cause'70 for a heuristic relation between the underlying facts and the
end result of discrimination.
Application of the above analysis to the ADEA militates in favor
of the Supreme Court upholding Congress' legislative judgment. As
Judge Hatchett argues in his Kimel dissent, the ADEA represents an
appropriate, proportional, remedial and preventative measure to com-
bat age discrimination.' 7' The Act tracks the analysis set forth above
almost precisely. The Supreme Court in a line of decisions has re-
fused to find age discrimination presumptively unconstitutional, but
nonetheless has stated that the aged are free from arbitrary and irra-
tional discrimination.'72 The ADEA's preamble states the law cor-
rectly, noting that the Act was intended to redress "arbitrary
discrimination" in employment due to irrational stereotypes. 73 Next,
Congress demonstrated that it was attempting to enforce the correct
standard. The legislative scheme, unlike that in Boerne, was the prod-
uct of a deliberate and considered legislative process, as demonstrated
by the legislative history.174 Beginning in the 1950s, Congress devoted
significant resources to inquire into the degree and frequency of age-
170. See Merritt, supra note 153, at 679 (suggesting that "substantial effects" test stated
by Lopez Court for determining whether an activity is related to commerce is equivalent to
"proximate cause" test in tort law).
171. See 139 F.3d at 1439-40.
172. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 471-72 (1991).
173. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1998).
174. See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1439; EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). The same
analysis applied to the ADA. On the factual predicate for the ADA, see S. Elizabeth
Silbom Malloy, Whose Federalism?, 32 IND. L. REv. 45, 56-58 (1998) (pointing out four-
teen congressional hearings, sixty-three field hearings, and hundreds of discrimination dia-
ries submitted in congressional record, along with findings that much of the discrimination
experienced by the forty-three million Americans with disabilities was intentional).
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based discrimination. Only after engaging in substantial research and
debate did Congress enact the legislation. 75 Rather than responding
to what it perceived as a misguided Supreme Court decision, Congress
was responding to a demonstrated need. Finally, the Act is no more
intrusive of state governmental functions than necessary to accom-
plish the purpose of redressing discrimination based on age. Given
the empirical foundation for the act and the minimal degree of intru-
siveness, congruence and proportionality are satisfied.
This model also explains the "presumption of validity" that the
judiciary accords to congressional judgments. 76 The requirement that
Congress acknowledge the prevailing judicial standard and hew
closely to that standard ensures that it will be acting within its sphere
of power and responsibility, thereby avoiding the type of interbranch
conflict that occurs when one institution usurps a role constitutionally
allocated to another. 77 Additionally, the model promotes dialogue
between Congress and the judiciary. 7 ' Congress may inform judicial
determinations as to the meaning of equal protection, but it cannot
substitute its interpretation of the Constitution for that of the Court.
Thus, the Court may agree with Congress' assessment that social real-
175. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 229-31 (describing legislative process).
176. See supra note 143 (questioning Boerne's bipolar references to standard for
deference).
177. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) ("When Congress acts within its
sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own
informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution."). See Mark A. Tushnet,
Two Versions of Judicial Supremacy, 39 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 945, 948 (1998) (stating that
when Congress makes decisions about scope of its power, the presumption of validity does
not apply).
178. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring
opinion) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also con-
templates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1998) (advocating increased dialogue between legislative
and judicial branches and espousing judicial use of "constitutional flares" to advise Con-
gress of potential constitutional infirmities in course of legislative conduct); ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, COURTS AND CoNGREss 1 (1997) ("Governance ... is premised on each insti-
tution's respect for and knowledge of the others and on a continuing dialogue that pro-
duces shared understanding and comity."); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The
Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1990) (noting
that while conventional scholarly wisdom posits control of federal jurisdiction with Con-
gress, the case law suggests that in fact the boundaries of federal jurisdiction evolve
through a "dialogic process of congressional enactment and judicial response"). On reso-
lution of constitutional meaning through interbranch dialogue, see generally Barry Fried-
man, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MIcH. L. Rnv. 577 (1993).
ity supports the legislation, as it did in Morgan and City of Rome,17 9 or
it can rule that Congress' conclusions are not sufficiently congruent or
proportional to an underlying evil to support the challenged legislative
scheme. In either event, this model's more nuanced approach avoids
the ratchet theory's problem of simply reformulating "interpretation"
as "fact-finding."180
Another way of looking at the model is to posit that Congress
may properly exercise some discretion when it formulates law or pol-
icy relating to the enforcement of rights under the Civil War Amend-
ments in response to "legislative," as opposed to "adjudicative," facts.
First drawn by Kenneth Culp Davis, 8' the distinction between legisla-
tive and adjudicative facts suggests both analytic and institutional
claims about the role of facts in constitutional law. 82 The analytic
claim is that facts are relevant to questions of constitutionality.'83 The
institutional claim is that "constitutional courts were poorly placed,
epistemically, to determine the truth about relevant legislative
facts."" On this view, Congress performs an auxiliary function of
supplementing the adjudicative record in support of its legislative
179. Cf Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of
Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. Cm. L. RFv. 819, 824 (1986) (stating that the Morgan
ratchet theory is "best understood as a tool that permits Congress to use its power to enact
ordinary legislation to engage the Court in a dialogue about fundamental rights.").
180. See Frickey, supra note 148, at 715-16 (criticizing Cox's institutional competencies
argument for a ratchet theory of congressional enforcement power) ("In the final analysis,
merely calling a question one of fact, and therefore for the legislature, or one of law, and
therefore for courts, substitutes result-oriented labeling for careful institutional analysis.").
181. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administra-
tive Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364, 402-03 (1942).
182. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. Rv. 759, 882 (1997) (summarizing Professor
Davis' distinctions). Adjudicative facts are those specific to the litigants in a particular
case - what the parties did, what the circumstances and background conditions were.
Legislative facts, on the other hand, "do not usually concern the immediate parties but are
the general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discre-
tion." 2 KENNETH DAVIs, ADMISTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 12:3, at 413 (2d ed. 1979).
On the role of facts in constitutional law, see generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 229 (1985); Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979
Term Forward: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1980);
Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 931 (1980).
183. See also Kenneth Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. Cr.
Rlv. 75, 85 (observing that "a court normally examines legislative facts not to determine
their 'truth,' but to determine whether a reasonable legislative judgment could have been
made supporting the statute in its enacted form. In this context, 'reasonable' is only a
synonym for 'constitutional."').
184. Adler, supra note 182, at 883.
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judgment.185 By substantiating legislation historically and socially,
Congress facilitates the policy facet of the Court's decision-making
process. This model of judiciallcongressional interaction comports
with the Boerne Court's recognition that Congress must have wide
latitude in determining whether remedial legislation is, in fact, reme-
dial. There is no point in according wide latitude if in every instance
the Court plans to second guess congressional judgment. And in fact,
as the history of the voting rights cases suggests, the Court is willing to
give Congress substantial leeway, so long as its judgments are sup-
ported by demonstrated social realities.'86
Justice Harlan's Morgan dissent contains an excellent example of
this dialogue. 87 Harlan recognized that empirical foundation, rather
than abstract logic, was the proper basis for determining the scope of
congressional power. Moreover, he recognized that the judiciary was
not as well equipped as Congress to find the "legislative" facts rele-
vant to the constitutional inquiry. Thus, he welcomed the "volumi-
nous testimony" which had assisted the Court in upholding Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964188 and the Voting Rights Act.'8 9 He
found such persuasive empirical evidence to be lacking, however, in
Morgan, and thus could not join the majority's decision to defer to a
185. Because law requires finality, the conditions under which the judicial/congressional
dialogue operate are less than ideal. See SEX'.A BENHABIm, CRimoQuE, NORM, AND UTO-
PiA 285 (1986) (translating and stating ideal conditions for dialogue devised by democratic
theorist Jurgen Habermas). The Court's response to RFRA, for example, was appropriate
considering rules precluding legislative usurpation of the Court's definitional role. See
Devins, supra note 51, at 663 (noting that Congress and the White House sought "to beat
the Court into submission," not engage it in a dialogue about religious liberty protections).
But see Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 HARv. L. REv. 153, 172 (1997) (arguing that Justice O'Connor was attempting
to engage in a "dialogic" approach to section 5 power, which "assumes that Congress and
the Court are engaged in a mutually productive dialogue over the meaning of the
Constitution").
186. See Devins, supra note 51, at 656 n.77 (detailing give and take on voting rights
legislation). This tendency may also explain the Court's Thirteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence. In contrast to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment cases, the Court seems
more comfortable ascribing to Congress a largely unconstrained power to define the
"badges and the incidents of slavery." See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,440
(1968) (overturning the Thirteenth Amendment holding of The Civil Rights Cases). How-
ever, the Court itself gave the Thirteenth Amendment a very limited scope in Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971) (ruling that city's decision to close public pool rather
than desegregate could not be construed as "badge or incident" of slavery), and there is
little reason to suspect that the Court would countenance congressional departure from
that view.
187. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 669 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964)).
189. See id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)).
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congressional "announcement," as opposed to a congressional finding
of fact.19° Harlan may have undersold the state of the congressional
record with reference to the literacy provisions,191 but his distinction is
important. It demonstrates the difference, for purposes of according
deference, between formal findings and documented and supportable
empirical findings.
Applying some variant of the analysis presented above, most
courts to have addressed the issue have concluded that the ADA and
ADEA represent appropriate exercises of Congress' section 5
power.192 That some courts have rejected this analysis is more a func-
tion of antipathy toward antidiscrimination law than faithful applica-
tion of the Boerne analysis.193 In other cases, however, the decision is
explicable not by a particular dislike of the statutes at issue, but rather
a predilection for situating Boerne within the recent line of federalism
decisions issued by the Court. 94
190. Id.
191. See id. at 663-64 (detailing congressional findings).
192. See supra notes 127-130 (listing decisions concerning constitutionality of ADEA
and ADA as against state claims of immunity).
193. See supra note 13 (discussing "special rights" approach to antidiscrimination
decisions).
194. Two recent such decisions have implications for the issues under examination in
this article. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, ._ 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999), the Court
determined that in general Congress does not have the power to subject states to suit in
state court anymore than it may subject states to suit in federal court, except where it acts
pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers. If the Court determines in Kimel that the
ADEA is not a proper exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment power, then citizens
subject to age discrimination would thus have recourse only to various state human rights
acts that contain provisions proscribing age discrimination.
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999), decided the same day as Alden, the Court held that Congress could not under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pass amendments to federal patent
laws designed to abrogate state sovereign immunity against patent infringement actions
where the underlying problem - unremedied state infringement of private patents - did
not transgress the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. That is, the Court
held that in order to support the legislative action in question - subjecting states to suit
for patent infringement - Congress would have had to identify a widespread pattern of
states infringing patents without providing due process to the aggrieved parties. While
Congress did identify instances of states subjected to suit for infringement, the Court ob-
served that Congress' primary motivation in passing the legislation was not to provide a
singular remedy, but rather to provide uniformity and convenience in patent actions. Be-
cause such considerations were not predicated on constitutional (i.e., procedural due pro-
cess) violations, the Court ruled that the patent amendments were not proportionate to a
supposed remedial or preventative objective and thus ran afoul of Boerne. Relying on this
decision, an Eighth Circuit panel ruled that the Individuals with Disabilities in Education
Act (IDEA) did not state adequate "constitutional transgressions" to support that legisla-
tive scheme. Bradley v. Arkansas Dept. of Educ., No. 98-1010, at 9 (8th Cir. Aug. 31,
1999), overruling Mauney v. Arkansas Dept. of Educ., No. 98-1721, 1999 WL 407763 (8th
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IV. Applying Boerne's Vertical Structure
A. Proportionality or Federalism?
Separation of powers principles operate to preclude congres-
sional overreaching of state interests. Boerne's discussion of the de-
gree to which RFRA intruded on traditional state prerogatives
paralleled the Morgan Court's earlier recognition that intrusiveness is
properly a consideration for the Court when evaluating the factual
predicate for congressional enforcement actions. 95 That is, federal-
ism concerns' 96 are an aspect of the Court's proportionality analysis,
rather than a separate and independent constraint on congressional
power. In Morgan, the Court observed that in assessing congressional
authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was neces-
sary to balance the state interest served by the challenged practice
against the interest promoted by the federal intrusion.197 Using simi-
lar language, Boerne decried the unnecessary intrusion engendered by
the sweeping scope of RFRA. 98 Like Morgan, this analysis was not
based on abstract concern for state sovereignty, but rather on concrete
observations concerning shortcomings in statutory construction. In
comparing RFRA to statutes upheld in prior section 5 cases, the
Boerne Court distinguished that legislation on the basis of the viru-
lence and persistence of the evil to be redressed, the careful delinea-
tion of geographic scope, and temporal limitations, among other
grounds.' 99 In general, the Court concluded that the burden placed
on the states in defending against claims brought under RFRA far
outweighed the incidences of discriminatory treatment based on reli-
gion. As with the Morgan Court, this balancing was simply another
Cir. June 14, 1999). One might respond, of course, that the IDEA was predicated on pre-
cisely the type of facts absent in Boerne and Florida Prepaid. The court disagreed with this
assessment, however, stating that congressional findings regarding the disparate treatment
received by disabled children did not indicate that such treatment of disabled children did
not indicate that such treatment was the result of unconstitutional state action. See id. at
10 (citing Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. at 2207).
195. See supra note 30 and text accompanying note (noting that the level of intrusive-
ness of state interests is a factor in evaluation of congressionally-fashioned remedies).
196. "Federalism" is a vague term, but generally refers to a political system in which
subordinate units retain areas of jurisdiction that cannot be invaded by the central author-
ity. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neu-
rosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 911 (1994) (defining federalism in contrast to
decentralization); see also supra note 10 (referring to federalism as a balanced federal/state
power structure, with a philosophical bias toward state power).
197. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 (requiring examination of the "nature and significance" of
the state interests that would be affected by federal intrusion).
198. 521 U.S. at 533.
199. See id. (comparing RFRA to other section 5 legislation).
factor to consider in assessing the constitutional propriety of congres-
sional action.
Despite Boerne's comfortable location within separation of pow-
ers doctrine, some courts and commentators have insisted on reading
the opinion to establish federalism as an independent ground for judi-
cial review of congressional enforcement action under the Civil War
Amendments. The Boerne Court's failure to explicitly state that con-
siderations of intrusiveness were an aspect of separation of powers has
contributed to this misreading. While most courts have simply ig-
nored the allusions to federalism, the decisions in Brown v. North Car-
olina Division of Motor Vehicles2°° and Humenansky v. Regents of the
Univ. of Minnesota20 1 indicate that some judges have read the Boerne
decision to impose strict federalism restrictions on Congress' power to
enforce equal protection. Since Boerne's central holding-that Con-
gress may not fix the meaning of the Constitution-is explainable
solely by recourse to separation of powers principles, the federalism
discussion seems extraneous. Why, then, the allusions to federalism?
And, given the traditional argument that federalism restrictions do
not reach the Civil War Amendments, one might ask on what grounds
federalism appears at all in analyzing section 5 power?
B. What's Federalism Got To Do With It?
The short answer is nothing. Boerne cannot be read as identify-
ing federalism as an independent ground for limiting congressional
power. In addition to the decision's strong separation of powers bias,
there are two additional reasons for this conclusion. The first is that
precedent does not support application of historically anterior federal-
ism principles in the Fourteenth Amendment context. The second is
that such a reading would undermine democratic norms embodied in
the equal protection doctrine. Any structural concerns are displaced
to the extent that they impede achievement and implementation of
democratic norms that form the basis for legitimizing constitutional
governance in a democratic, pluralist society.
Despite these strong arguments, the Boerne Court encouraged
misinterpretation by citing to no authority in support of its application
of federalism principles. 2' Nonetheless, courts giving Boerne a strong
federalism bias must be required to locate the case within a larger
doctrinal framework. The most obvious sources for such a reading,
200. 166 F.3d 698, 704-06 (4th Cir. 1999).
201. 152 F.3d 822, 826-28 (8th Cir. 1998).
202. 521 U.S. at 533.
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aside from the Morgan analysis mentioned above, are the opinions of
Justice Harlan in Morgan and Mitchell, Chief Justice Burger's dissent
in EEOC v. Wyoming, and the Court's hint in Gregory v. Ashcroft that
federalism principles have some application even when Congress leg-
islates under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is thus worthwhile to
evaluate the level of support in these decisions for a strong federalism
reading of Boerne.
1. Potential Authority For Boeme's Invocation of Federalism
a. Justice Harlan's Dissents in Morgan and Mitchell.
At the outset of his Morgan dissent, Justice Harlan identified the
intersecting vertical and horizontal difficulties posed by the issue of
section 5 power. As argued in part II, Harlan's dissent established a
makeshift congruence and proportionality test and found the literacy-
test provision of the Voting Rights Act to be lacking. In asserting ju-
dicial supremacy in determining the scope of equal protection, Harlan
allowed that "[d]ecisions on questions of equal protection and due
process are based not on abstract logic, but on empirical founda-
tions."2 ' 3 As such, his vision presaged Boerne's support for judicial
and congressional dialogue, with the Court as final arbiter. This is
hardly the stuff that states' rights manifestos are made of.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Mitchell argued that "the Fourteenth
Amendment was never intended to restrict the states' authority to al-
locate their political power as they see fit" and thus cannot be said to
support congressional intrusion on their decision as to the appropriate
voting age for state officials.2 "4 Harlan proceeds, however, to make a
lengthy historical argument regarding "the purpose and effect of the
Fourteenth Amendment with respect to suffrage,"2 "5 concluding that
the 39th Congress did not intend the Fourteenth Amendment to ex-
tend the franchise to blacks.20 6 It is difficult, from this argument, to
draw the more general inference that Justice Harlan would have sup-
ported application of federalism principles where the Fourteenth
Amendment is in conflict with the Eleventh. While each dissent con-
tains rhetoric to the effect that federalism concerns are paramount
even when reviewing congressional enforcement under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Harlan's bark is worse than his bite. Both dissents, for
203. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966).
204. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 154 (1970).
205. I- at 200.
206. See id. at 152-219.
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all their rhetorical flourish, are tightly reasoned and fit completely
within the separation of powers framework set forth in Boerne.
b. Justice Burger's Dissent in EEOC v. Wyoming.2"7
A more plausible source for the proposition that federalism prin-
ciples are applicable against equal protection is Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in EEOC v. Wyoming. At least one court has identified that
decision as an antecedent to Boerne; in a decision finding that the
ADEA does not represent a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment power, a divided Eighth Circuit panel asserted that
"Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Wyoming reads like a preview of the
Court's opinion in City of Boerne."2 °8 This is correct only insofar as
the panel's decision replicates Burger's mistaken reasoning and
projects that analysis onto Boerne.
Burger's opinion appears to take the position that Congress is not
limited to legislating on behalf of groups adjudged by the Supreme
Court to warrant heightened scrutiny, but may identify violations
against individual members of a class that the Court has determined
warrant no more than rational basis scrutiny.2 °9 In addition to this
more traditional approach to the question of section 5 power, the dis-
sent contains explicit references to federalism-based restrictions on
congressional power. Justice Burger argued that Congress does not
have much flexibility when its judgments intrude upon "sovereign
[state] powers not expressly surrendered."'2 10 Although he treated the
issue of the ADEA's validity under the Fourteenth Amendment sepa-
rately from the issue of its validity under the Commerce Clause, it is
evident that Burger was influenced by similar Tenth Amendment con-
siderations in each analysis.2 ' Burger began his examination of the
207. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
208. Humenansky v. Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 828 (8th Cir. 1998).
209. See 460 U.S. at 260 (recognizing that application of strict scrutiny is not necessary
to a finding of unconstitutional discrimination). Unfortunately, the dissent presents an
early instance of conflating judicial review and congressional power, concluding that Con-
gress may not legislate on behalf of the aged because the Court had decided that factually
similar cases did not violate equal protection. This may be the right result, but it is the
wrong question. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text (discussing distinction be-
tween judicial standards and congressional power).
210. 460 U.S. at 263.
211. At the time of the Wyoming decision, Usery was still good law. Thus, Burger pur-
ported to apply the three-prong test devised for determining whether legislation enacted
under the Commerce Clause intruded upon Tenth Amendment rights, and ultimately con-
cluded that Congress' authority as limited by the protections of the Tenth Amendment
prohibit application of the ADEA to the states. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 252. Under that
test, the Court struck down attempted congressional regulation if it found that it 1) regu-
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ADEA's validity under the Fourteenth Amendment by expressly stat-
ing the inapplicability of his Commerce Clause analysis.2 12 He then
went on to invoke the very same considerations in finding that the
ADEA cannot be a valid enactment under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. While purporting to recognize that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's temporal relation to the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
significantly limited applicability of the latter amendments, Burger
nonetheless insisted that Congress does not have "a 'blank check' to
intrude into details of states' governments at will." '213 Though as a
doctrinal matter this statement represents nothing more than the tru-
ism that Congress must be acting within its enforcement powers when
it intrudes-a constraint already built into separation of powers analy-
sis-its rhetorical strength fuels states' rights arguments.
c. Gregory v. Ashcroft214
The doctrine/rhetoric dichotomy is similar in Gregory. On the
surface, the case involved a straightforward question of statutory con-
struction: the issue of whether the ADEA permitted Missouri state
court judges to challenge a provision of the Missouri Constitution im-
posing mandatory retirement at age 70.215 The state of Missouri ar-
gued that it did not, relying on a 1974 amendment which defined
''employee" to exclude from the act's protections "any person elected
to public office in any State... or an appointee on the policymaking
level. ' 216 The question was whether judges fell within that exclu-
sion.217 The majority, however, used the case as a vehicle to create a
lated the states as states; 2) addressed matters that were indisputably attributes of state
sovereignty; and 3) directly impaired the states' ability to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional functions. See id (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface and Mining Recla-
mation Assoc., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981)).
212. See id at 259.
213. Id
214. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
215. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 455 (citing Mo. Const. art. V, § 26).
216. Id at 464-65 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)). Missouri judges are appointed by the
governor, see Mo. Const., art. V, §§ 25(a)-(g), and subsequently are subject to election, see
id. at § 25(c)(1).
217. In dissent, Justice White (joined by Justice Stevens) observed that the Court
granted certiorari on the question of "[w]hether appointed Missouri state court judges are
'appointee[s] on the policymaking level' within the meaning of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act... and therefore exempted from the ADEA's general prohibition of
mandatory retirement and thus subject to the mandatory retirement provision of Article V,
Section 26 of the Missouri Constitution." 501 U.S. at 474 (citations omitted).
"clear statement rule"218 that imported Tenth Amendment considera-
tions into statutory construction.
By construing the statute to exclude judges, the Court avoided a
reevaluation of the recently decided Garcia. Instead, it created a clear
statement rule requiring Congress to plainly indicate its intent to ab-
rogate a state's Tenth Amendment freedom from intrusive federal
law. 9 Congress had failed to explicitly indicate such intent with re-
spect to the Missouri judges 220 A potential objection to this holding
was that the ADEA was passed pursuant to Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment, as opposed to Commerce Clause, power.221 Though the
question of the ADEA's propriety under section 5 had been reserved
in Wyoming, it seemed clear that federalism principles were inappo-
site in examining legislation enacted under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.222 Gregory altered that conception.
Rather than viewing federalism principles as entirely out of place,
the Court characterized their force as "attenuated when Congress acts
pursuant to its powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments." 2 3
That this failed to comport with precedent was made clear by Justice
White in dissent. Both Fitzpatrick and City of Rome established that
"principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to con-
gressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to en-
force the Civil War Amendments .... 224 Moreover, the clear
statement rule, imported from the Eleventh Amendment decision of
218. See WiLLAm N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHmLip P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEoISLAMON: STATUTES AND TEE CREATION OF PuBLiC POLICY 698 (2nd ed. 1994) (ex-
plaining clear statement rules).
219. See 501 U.S. at 464. Resolution of the case as a matter of statutory interpretation
would have been all the more appropriate considering the avoidance of deciding unneces-
sary constitutional questions remains. But cf. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85
GEo. LJ. 1945, 1965 n.100 (1997) (arguing that courts seem in some instances to adopt an
aggressive "non-avoidance" stance in which they either select a reading of the statute that,
while "better," does not avoid the constitutional question, or actually affirmatively court
the question). In a crowning irony, the Court asserted that it did in fact construe the
ADEA to exempt state judges from its protections in order to "avoid a potential constitu-
tional problem." 501 U.S. at 464. The constitutional question avoided was illusory. See
Vermeule, supra at 1977 n.84 (describing clear-statement rule as blunt-force alternative to
unworkable National League of Cities test). As Justice White stated in dissent, "[i]t is far
from clear, however, why there would be a constitutional problem if the ADEA applied to
state judges, in light of our decision [ in Garcia." 501 U.S. at 479.
220. See 501 U.S. at 467.
221. See id. at 467-68.
222. The Court admitted as much: "One might argue.., that if Congress passed the
ADEA extension under its section 5 powers, the concerns about federal intrusion into
state government that compel the result in this case might carry less weight." Id at 468.
223. Id. at 468 (citing Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243).
224. Id. at 480 (quoting City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179).
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Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,225 merely insisted
that Congress be clear that it intended to exercise its Fourteenth
Amendment power, as opposed to some other power. It did not place
limitations on the power itself.2 26
For the proposition that Congress' Fourteenth Amendment
Power is limited, the Court turned to a line of decisions holding that
even though aliens are a suspect class whose equal protection claims
receive close judicial scrutiny, their claims will receive only minimal
review when the state excludes them from political functions within
the system of state governance.227 In Sugarman v. Dougal,228 the
Court had identified aliens as "a prime example of a 'discrete and
insular' minority" whose claims receive generous judicial attention.
Nonetheless, the Court carved out a "political function" exception to
the rule of heightened scrutiny and applied that rule in upholding
state laws that excluded aliens from working as state troopers,229 pub-
lic school teachers," 0 and deputy probation officers.231 The excep-
tion-which is suggestive of limitations on congressional power-is
essentially federalism-based, in that it excepts core state functions
from close scrutiny under the federal Constitution.
Justice White argued that reliance on the Sugarman line of cases
was misplaced. He noted that while that line of cases did indicate that
the Court permitted federalism concerns to limit its application of
equal protection law, it did not support the proposition that the same
considerations should limit Congress' ability to legislate under the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, since it is the role of the Court to
determine the scope of Congress' authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment, this objection is not persuasive. The problem with the
Court's decision in Gregory is not that it does not have the power to
determine that federalism principles apply when Congress legislates
pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers. It does. The problem
is that the Court does not provide any justification for imposing those
limitations, other than its contention that the states should remain
largely free from federal intrusion. This assertion may be valid in
225. 451 U.S. 1 (1981)
226. See idL at 480-81 (citing Halderman, 451 U.S. at 16).
227. See id. at 468-69.
228. 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973).
229. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-300 (1978).
230. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-81 (1979).
231. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 444-48 (1982). The Court also ruled,
however, that exclusion of aliens from the position of notary public was not supported by
the political function exception. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221-27 (1984).
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some spheres, particularly where reserved powers are at issue. It
places the constitutional cart before the horse, however, when the
political protections embodied in the Civil War Amendments are at
issue.
In one sense, Gregory should not matter. Its central holding was
to create a rule of statutory construction that applies only where Con-
gress fails to clearly state its intent to abrogate federalism barriers to
its enforcement powers.332 Its limited utility, as precedent, was to re-
flect the states'-rights bias of the Rehnquist Court by forcing Congress
to share the Court's concerns - ultimately resulting in better con-
structed and more nuanced statutes, if not finally in abdication to the
Court's vision of federalism.23 Moreover, Morgan, though rhetori-
cally in a separate dimension, had much earlier acknowledged the pro-
priety of federalism-based constraints on congressional power. 34 In
another sense, however, Gregory clearly tips the hand of the Supreme
Court. It informs litigants and the federal judiciary that the Court is
willing to go out of its way to vindicate what it deems to be states'
rights. Despite Supreme Court admonitions against lower courts ac-
tivism,2 35 some courts have viewed Gregory as an invitation to under-
take a revisionist interpretation of congressional power.
One such decision is Brown v. North Carolina Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles." 6 In that case, a panel of the Fourth Circuit ruled that a
232. See Matt Pawa, Note, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can
Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA.
L. REv. 1029, 1084 (1993).
233. Professor Frickey has succinctly captured the salient effects of Gregory:
The clear-statement requirement adopted in Gregory is a forthright judicial effort
to influence congressional processes. Most obviously, the approach attempts to
force Congress to draft statutes clearly. More subtly, it essentially seeks not just to
force the objection based on the invasion of state sovereignty onto the congres-
sional agenda, but also to highlight it. The assumption must be that the Gregory
canon of interpretation will lead to more thorough and thoughtful congressional
deliberations concerning whether invasions of state sovereignty are justified, and
is not simply a way to prevent wholly inadvertent intrusions on state authority.
Frickey, supra note 148, at 722. This reading of Gregory comports with concerns expressed
by members of the current Court at oral argument in Kimel. See supra note 194.
234. See supra note 197.
235. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,236 (1997) (reaffirming that "if a precedent of
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions") (quoting Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989)); West v. Anne
Arundel County, 137 F.3d 752,760 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Lower federal courts have repeatedly
been warned about the impropriety of preemptively overturning Supreme Court
precedent.").
236. 166 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 1999).
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regulation, promulgated under the ADA, prohibiting public entities
from charging a fee to beneficiaries of programs designed to ensure
accessibility for the disabled in order to cover the cost of such pro-
grams, exceeded the remedial scope of Congress' section 5 enforce-
ment power. At the outset of the opinion's discussion section, Judge
Wilkinson, writing for the Court, noted disagreement over the sort of
review envisioned by Boerne. 37 The government urged, citing other
decisions, that the constitutionality of the ADA should be decided on
the basis of the entire statutory framework.? 8 This argument was
supportable by convention: each court to examine the ADA upon an
Eleventh Amendment challenge had looked to the statute in toto,
rather than evaluate a discrete regulation. Nonetheless, the court dis-
agreed, invoking the canon of avoiding constitutional questions and
assuming problems of administrability in order to justify piecemeal
examination of regulations promulgated under the statute.239
More to the point, however, the Court suggested that broad-
based review of a statutory scheme would "leave under protected...
important state interests in immunity. '240 The court supposed that be-
cause abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets a fundamental consti-
tutional balance between the state and federal governments, courts
must exercise great caution in finding abrogation.241 The court ex-
pressed concern that ratification of an entire statute - and the at-
tendant finding of abrogation - without assessing the
constitutionality on equal protection grounds of the particular statu-
tory or regulatory basis for suit might result in the subjection of a state
to suit based on "an unconstitutional provision buried in the midst of
an otherwise constitutional statutory scheme."'242
This approach exhibits the same flaw that undermines Judge
Cox's opinion in Kimel - it defies the language of Boerne.243 Like
237. See id. at 703.
238. See id. (citing Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998)).
239. See id. at 703-04.
240. Id. at 704.
241. See id. (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989)).
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 158-165 and accompanying text (discussing failure of Kimel plural-
ity to give effect to language in Boerne supporting broad congressional enforcement
power). An additional problem is the case cited in support of piecemeal review does not in
reality support it. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), did not concern review of the
constitutional propriety of substantive law, but rather the level of clarity necessary to draw
an inference of congressional intent. In that case, the Court ruled that an intent to abro-
gate Eleventh Amendment immunity would not be assumed, but rather must be accompa-
nied by a clear statement of intent to abrogate. See id. at 227-32. The case thus involved
only the Court's insistence that Congress exercise care in abrogating immunity, as opposed
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Judge Cox, the Brown Court ignores language in Boerne explaining
that Congress' enforcement power is preventative, as well as remedial,
and that some otherwise constitutional behavior may permissibly be
swept up in otherwise reasonable regulation. By subjecting the regu-
latory scheme to piecemeal analysis, the Brown court negates this lan-
guage. But unlike the court in Kimel, it appears to do so on a
principled basis - the basis that states should be free from overly
intrusive regulation. The question is whether this principle trumps the
principles vindicated by enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Is Federalism Really the First Principle?2'
Of the considerable claims made on behalf of federalism,2 45 two
have particular relevance to the question of whether federalism
should be permitted to act as an independent constraint on congres-
sional enforcement of equal protection. These are the assertions that
federalism promotes participation in democratic institutions and safe-
guards political liberties. The crux of such claims is that political par-
ticipation increases in inverse proportion to centralization, thereby
checking potential abuse of governmental authority.246 In abbrevi-
ated form, the argument runs as follows: because elected representa-
tives are more accountable to a constituency that is small and more
fully apprised of their actions, democratic ideals are thought to be
more fully realized.247 Decentralized governments also foster provi-
dent decision-making because greater popular involvement heightens
awareness of the costs of a given policy choice. Congruence of mores
between citizens and political representatives at the state and local
level, as well as improved efficiencies due to scale, facilitate this pro-
to authority for the proposition that the judiciary should micro-manage the enforcement
power.
244. Cf. Lopez, 511 U.S. at 1031 ("We start with first principles. The Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.").
245. See Calabresi, supra note 21, at 777-78 (stating economic and political science ar-
guments in favor of federalism).
246. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991) (stating that "the principal bene-
fit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power").
247. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERAusM: A DIALOGUE 92, n.124 (1995) (tracing argu-
ment to political theory of Montesquieu, Plato, and Aristotle). See Larry Kramer, Under-
standing Federalism, 47 VAN-D. L. RFv. 1485, 1498 (1994). The question of whether
democracy will be better promoted on the state level may depend on the size and structure
of the state. See Friedman, supra note 11, at 390 n.309 (noting that the criticisms of the
assumption that federalism will yield greater participation fail to account for local differ-
ences). But see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 196, at 915-16 (arguing that devolution of
power to states does not foster participation as most participation occurs at the local level).
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cess.2 48 Finally, the right of exit permitted by multiple jurisdictions
allows those who "fall out of sympathy with the orthodoxy that may
predominate in one state to seek refuge in another. '249 In sum, devo-
lution is viewed as a panacea for democratic governance.
While this view has considerable persuasive force, the notion that
participation and liberty are best promoted by a centrifugal power
structure is subject to a fatal flaw when taken to an extreme position.
The primacy of the democratic norms realized through the Fourteenth
Amendment over those inherent in the federalist structure derives not
simply from that amendment's ordinal superiority, but also from the
historically-based notion that a strong central government is necessary
to protect individuals and groups against state repression °50 Other
empirically testable arguments that may undermine the necessity of
judicial enforced federalism do not rely on the history of state discrim-
ination against racial and other minorities." If the interests of all
citizens are considered, the argument that devolution fosters citizen
participation is historically counterfactual. Political participation, at
any level, is likely to favor elites 5 2 Unfortunately, devolution does
not offer a palliative to problems associated with political exclusion.5 3
This flaw in enforcing federalism as an independent constraint on
Congress' section 5 power provides a more structurally compelling ar-
gument for undermining the attempted reading of Boerne as a Four-
teenth Amendment analogue to Lopez than the deference model
248. See Calabresi, supra note 21, at 777-78.
249. Shapiro, supra note 247, at 95.
250. This perspective situates the tension between individual rights and states' rights
perspectives as descending from the tendentious arguments advanced by John Calhoun,
who used states' rights as an apology for slavery. See id. at 53 n.138 (citing THE PAPERS OF
JoHN C. CALHouN (R. Meriwether ed. 1959)). The location of the abolitionist movement
in the North and the defiance of federal authority with respect to fugitive slaves by some
Northern states may have also contributed to the tension. See id. at 53.
251. See Herbert Wecshler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selections of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. Rnv.
543, 546-58 (1954) (asserting the judicial enforcement of federalism is rendered unneces-
sary by the fact that members of Congress represent the interests of states and will thus
guard against federal expansion at states' expense); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985) (adopting Wecshler's argument in overturning National
League of Cities v. Usery); Kramer, supra note 247, at 1522-23 (arguing that judicial en-
forcement of federalism is unnecessary because the culture of political parties precludes
politicians on the federal level from intruding on their state counterparts' issue turf).
252. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 196, at 915 (arguing that less fortunate citizens will
as likely be excluded and disadvantaged at the local as at the national level).
253. This is the central assertion in Madison's Federalist No. 10. Madison believed that
in a small republic, certain passions could induce the majority to approve violations of
minority or individual rights. See The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
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outlined above.2 5 4 Because it charts the political shift toward an inclu-
sive democracy, the Fourteenth Amendment is different from the
Commerce Clause. As Professor Blumstein has stated, part of the
federalism "deal"-devolution of power to local governments in areas
where local interests are reserved or the national interest is attenu-
ated-is strong national authority in the area of antidiscrimination
law. 255 Unrestrained judicial enforcement of federalism subverts the
values of democracy and undermines the legitimacy of the law." 6 For
example, the Court has reduced or eliminated minority political pro-
tections in areas as diverse as voting rights,1 7 school desegregation,"
and housing discrimination,2 9 all in the name of states' rights and lo-
cal control.26°
254. See supra notes 25-45; 154-57 and accompanying text (suggesting analytical model
to explain judicial deference to exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power).
255. James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing
Paradigms, 47 VAsND. L. Rnv. 1251, 1253 (1994).
256. See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text (explaining how unrestrained judi-
cial enforcement of federalism undermines legitimacy and subverts democratic norms).
257. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (rejecting interpretation of Voting
Rights Act that would grant Justice Department power to require states to create legisla-
tive districts that maximize minority-voting strength absent showing of identifiable, inten-
tional acts of discrimination against minority voters); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
(holding that odd-shaped legislative district designed by North Carolina legislature consti-
tuted racial segregation without sufficiently compelling justification). Cf. City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980). Justice Powell argued that our "federal system
allocates primary control over elections to state and local officials." 446 U.S. at 201 n.12
(Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell found federal encroachment troubling because it
"destroys local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our
polity." Id. at 201 (footnote omitted).
258. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) (invoking "vital national tradition"
of local autonomy over schools in ruling that district court desegregation plan exceeded
constitutional propriety); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (stating that restora-
tion of local control must be an aspect of remedial plan in desegregation cases).
259. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (ruling that contempt sanction
imposed on city council members in their individual capacity for refusal to comply with
consent decree was inconsistent with notion that they should be able to represent their
constituents views, no matter how retrograde).
260. By contrast, in the arena of affirmative action, the Court has ruled that no local
interest short of remedying past intentional discriminatory conduct was sufficient to justify
preferences designed to equalize the playing field for victims of pervasive societal racism.
See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516 (1989). The Court has, in fact, been
more consistent in opposing legislative efforts to benefit minorities than it has in protecting
states' rights. This inconsistency has given rise to claims that invocations of federalism are
little more than rhetorical embellishments designed to lend further credence to a particular
normative position. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 196, at 948 (describing federalism as
"often nothing more than strategies to advance substantive positions"); Norman Redlich &
David R. Lurie, Federalism: A Surrogate for What Really Matters, 23 Omo N.U. L. Rnv.
1273, 1273, 1279-80 (1997) (citing instances in which shifting invocations belie principled
allegiance to federalism); FEDERALISM: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 8, at
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In order to ameliorate this troubling reality, proponents of ascen-
dant federalism present two counterarguments. First, they posit that
the discrimination-based barriers to the achievement of full participa-
tion are largely a thing of the past.26' Second, they hearken back to an
originalist perspective emphasizing the eighteenth-century certitude
that accountability and trustworthiness of elected representatives
would dissipate in direct proportion to the size of the republic.2 62 Un-
fortunately, this description of our progress in the civil rights arena
bears little resemblance to the lived reality of minority populations.263
While ascendant federalists insist on a color-blind constitution -
thereby envisioning a land where race does not matter because it
should not matter2 4 - color is all too real an indicator for all manner
of social anomie.265 Yet at the intersection of federalism and equal
protection, the former predominates because the messiness of dealing
with the aftermath of an apartheid system is made to evaporate as the
function of a calculus that substitutes the normative for the
descriptive.
21. Given the pattern in civil rights decisions - states' rights are minimized only when
states attempt to protect minority political interests - Professor Nowak's fear that the cur-
rent Supreme Court's effort to "reverse" the Civil War Amendments is founded on racism
is understandable. See John E. Nowak, Federalism and the Civil War Amendments, 23
OHIo N.U.L. Rav. 1209, 1211, 1215-17, 1236 (1997) (arguing that Rehnquist Court invokes
arguments similar in tone and result to those of the Plessy Court); cf. WILLIAM RIKER,
FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 (1964) (stating that "[i]f in the
United States one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism").
261. See supra note 5 (discussing Fourth Circuit's Brzonkala decision).
262. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311,
1381-82 (1997) (discussing anti-federalist objections to centralized power); supra notes 237-
40 (stating this argument).
263. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BorroM OF THE WELL: THE PERmA-
NENCE OF RACISM (1992) (illustrating ways in which legal narrative departs from racial
reality); Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race, 23 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 407 (1988) (discussing how differences in the experience of race colors polit-
ical and legal theory).
264. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 47-52 (1991) (arguing that formal legal definitions of race misconceive the nature
of race in America); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM.
L. REv. 1060, 1121-25 (1991) (arguing that race-consciousness is a prerequisite to meaning-
ful equal protection).
265. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (examining how race and poverty
intersect to perpetuate black poverty, crime, and social disorder); WILLIAM JULIUS WIL-
SON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER Crry, Tm UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 58-61 (1987) (describing "concentration effects," in which the lack of access to job
networks, quality schools, and other opportunity structures places entire urban ecological
niches at enormous social disadvantage).
VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL TENSIONS
Aside from persistent issues of racial inequality, ascendant judi-
cial federalism implicates the participation interests of women, the
disabled, and the aged, and other groups. In these contexts as well,
the originalist argument devalues changes wrought by the Civil War
Amendments and elevates historical privilege over equality and par-
ticipation in constitutional interpretation. 266 The original understand-
ing contributes little, however, to the debate over the extent to which
federalism values should give way to equality-based considerations.267
The framers of the Constitution did not intend to create a democratic
system and gave little thought to vindicating democratic values.268
Only with the twentieth century were the nascent democratic leanings
in the American experience realized in any meaningful way. 69 Pas-
sage of the Civil War Amendments reflected a transition from a
purely republican form of government to a more democratic system
and a concomitant shift away from an exclusive preoccupation with
liberty and toward an additional concern with equality.270 Because it
is predicated on superceded assumptions, the participation-based ar-
gument for devolution is incomplete. It fails to comprehend the initial
issue of access to political institutions as prior to any argument regard-
ing conservation and expansion of local control.27' If some citizens
266. The purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to clarify the role of equality in the
Constitution. See Nowak, supra note 260, at 1211; see also Steven L. Carter, When Victims
Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 433-34 (1988) (remarking that the Civil War
Amendments were intended to redress oppression, not categorization); Christopher L. Eis-
gruber, Political Unity and the Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L. Rv. 1297, 1315 n.72
(1994) (remarking that purpose of Civil War Amendments was to affirm citizenship).
267. Professor Calabresi, supra note 21, at 787, states that Rubin and Feeley, in terming
federalism a historical artifact, ignore the constitutional imperative of maintaining a feder-
alist structure. See also Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal
Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VArN. L. Rnv. 1303, 1348 n.161 (1994) (assert-
ing that federalism is indispensable to our governmental structure). One might counter,
however, that super-enforcement of federalism principles ignores the constitutional imper-
ative of enforcing democratic norms.
268. See MORTnR J. ADLER, WE HoLD TrrnsE TRuTHS 140 (1987) (commenting that
the Founders either gave no thought to equality or if they did, had "obstinate prejudices"
against the concept). The founders did not intend to create a representative democracy,
but rather a republic. See Arthur S. Miller, Myth and Reality in American Constitutional-
ism, 63 TEx. L. RIv. 181, 189 (1984) (book review) (explaining that democracy was "ab-
horrent" to Founders, who intended a republican system).
269. Adler maintains that "[a]ll constitutional democracies are republics, but not all
republics are constitutional democracies." ADLER, supra note 268, at 138. The latter only
begin to exist upon institution of universal suffrage; the former only requires that some
members of society enjoy political liberty by virtue of suffrage.
270. See id. at 139.
271. But see Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13
GA. ST. U. L. Rv. 1009 (1997) (suggesting that federalism is anterior to democracy).
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are not able to participate in the first place, local control actually of-
fends the principle of participation, rather than enhancing it.
3. The Democratic Foundations of Equal Protection are Antecedent to
Federalism
Professor Karst has argued that the judicial meaning of the Civil
War Amendments is grounded in a right to belong to and participate
fully in society. 2  This somewhat amorphous right changes along with
society's conception of what it means to be a fully participating mem-
ber of society. At one point, political equality was deemed sufficient
to satisfy the requisites of the Civil War Amendments.27 Later, how-
ever, it became apparent that political and social equality are inextri-
cably interrelated.274 In order for equality to be meaningful, it must
allow for participation in the common life of society.275 It must recog-
nize that only through a sense of belonging and membership do the
values of society take on meaning.276
That the democratic ideal of meaningful participation has been
operationalized through the vehicle of the Fourteenth Amendment
finds support in the case law.277 When the Court in Plyler v. Doe2 78
ruled unconstitutional a Texas law denying the children of illegal
aliens access to public education, it recognized that the state may not
deprive them of full membership in their society.279 In Cleburne Liv-
ing Center v. City of Cleburne,80 the Court operationalized this con-
cept, ruling that all citizens, and not just members of certain groups,
have the right to be free from arbitrary and irrational discrimina-
272. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQuAL CrIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 54-56 (1989).
273. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
274. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
275. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR
A NEW AGE xv (1984). But see Mark Thshnet, Darkness at the Edge of Town, 89 YALE LJ.
1037, 1047 (1980) (arguing that it is unclear whether participation is a value that Americans
universally embrace).
276. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31-35 (1983).
277. Justice Harlan is of course correct in stating that whenever "the Court gives the
language of the Constitution an unforeseen application, it does so, whether explicitly or
implicitly, in the name of some underlying purpose of the Framers." Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202,202-03 (1980). But it is also indisputable that "[n]otions of what constitutes equal
treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change." Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
278. 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1980).
279. The Court also explained that when some members of society are excluded as a
class, the entire nation suffers from the ensuing social and economic problems. See id.
280. 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1984).
tion.2 1 As we saw above, the meaning of "invidious" will differ from
one interpretive community to another .82 In a democratic commu-
nity, however, offensive discrimination will be at least that which in-
hibits participatory access in a manner that undermines membership
in society.283
This definition finds support in Romer v. Evans.'84 In that case
the Court held that Amendment 2 - a Colorado constitutional
amendment that forbade the enactment of any legislation, regulation,
ordinance, or policy forbidding discrimination against homosexuals -
violated federal equal protection guarantees. Justice Kennedy opened
the discussion by defining equal protection as barring only formal im-
pediments to political access based on group membership." 5 How-
ever, the Courts' rejection of Colorado's rationale for a law that
stripped gays and lesbians of political protections belies any pure dis-
tinction between "formal" and "substantive" equal protection. Colo-
rado argued that Amendment 2 simply placed gays and lesbians in the
same position as all other persons.286 The Court rejected this ration-
ale, however, at least in part because the amendment had the effect of
diminishing gay and lesbian membership in society.287 The impermis-
sible motive rationale for the decision is far broader than the Court's
other stated basis for its decision. That reason is the "peculiar prop-
281. The Cleburne Court described arbitrary and irrational discrimination as "invidi-
ous," or offensive discrimination. See id.; supra note 131 (defining term).
282. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. When Michael Klarman states that he
does not see why, in attempting to develop a "neutral" theory of judicial review, John Hart
Ely thought equal concern and respect were "neutral" values, he fails to apprehend the
basic premise of interpretive communities. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resist-
ance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. Ruv. 747, 785-86 (1991). Ely thought these
values neutral because, from within the perspective of a democratic system, they are funda-
mental. Thus commitment to those values is at least ostensibly shared by all members of
our society. See infra note 294 (elaborating on concept of baseline democratic values).
283. See id.
284. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
285. See iL at 623.
286. See id. at 624.
287. The Court stated two distinct rationales for its decision. First is the impermissible
motive rationale. The Court intimated that it is not a legitimate government interest to
direct animus toward a particular group. This leaves the question whether moral disap-
proval is a "legitimate" state interest under equal protection analysis. See Barbara J.
Flagg, Essay, "Animus" & Moral Disapproval: A Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 Mn.i.
L. REv. 833, 836 (1998). The Court suggested a congruence test. Because there was no
congruence between the state's asserted purposes-respect for freedom of association and
conservation of resources-and the means chosen to achieve that end, the Court could
identify no purpose other than animus. This presumption appears to be a stronger version
of the statement in Cleburne that the state's desire to harm a particular group is never a
legitimate governmental interest. See 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
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erty" of Amendment 2 of "imposing a broad and undifferentiated dis-
ability on a single named group.' '21 8 Because legislation that explicitly
limits the rights of an identifiable group is quite rare, the "outlaw"
rationale is ultimately a narrow ground for decision.289 However,
there is also a point of elision between the two grounds for decision,
and it is possible that the Court would choose to follow the "outlaw"
principle in a subsequent decision rather than apply the "impermissi-
ble motive" rationale. This is because the bad-motive presumption
can only operate in obvious situations where no other explanation has
any persuasive force. Thus, the Court has left itself an "out," perhaps
with homosexual marriage specifically in mind. As Justice Scalia's dis-
sent emphasized, the decision was ultimately about power: whether
we as a society want to uphold the right of the majority to exclude
certain members on the basis of group affiliation, or want to aspire to
the democratic ideals of equality.290 Not surprisingly, the Court chose
to vindicate the latter concept.29' Amendment 2 thus nicely captures
the relationship between participation at the state level and the need
for judicial enforcement of democratic norms. Devotion to purely
popular mechanisms for resolving disputes, absent situation within
any larger political context, will sometimes result in open hostility to-
ward sexual or other minorities.292 Recourse to basic democratic prin-
ciples is necessary to bridge the gulf between the rhetoric of
288. Romer, 517 U.S. at 630.
289. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 257, 266-67 (1996) (stating that as a matter of equal protection the government can-
not create or sanction the creation of the outcast groups).
290. 517 U.S. at 636-53.
291. Professor Michel Rosenfeld has argued that abstract notions of equality are not
only the foundation of our society, but at the most abstract level, of all political liberalism.
See MICHBEL ROSENFELD, Ai~mmATrvm ACnoN AND JusTicE 20, 254 (1991). This obser-
vation neutralizes a subtext of Scalia's argument: that those with the most power should
prevail. As Julian Eule has put it, "[d]emocracy is a slippery term." Julian Eule, Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J 1503, 1531 (1990). What is clear is that democ-
racy is not synonymous with majoritarianism. It is a complex concept imbued with particu-
lar substantive values that each member of society presumptively adopts and thus cannot
be reduced merely to "a show of hands." Id (arguing that Alexander Bickel unwittingly
confused the issue through negative impication-"the counter-majoritarian difficulty" of
judicial review implied that democracy is majoritarian); Frank Michelman, "Protecting the
People from Themselves," or How Direct Can Democracy Be?, 45 UCLA L. Rnv. 1717,
1733 (noting that democracy connotes not only a joint decision-making procedure, but also
a normative commitment to certain socially constituted relationships among participants);
see also Ely, supra note 10 (suggesting that equal concern and respect are baseline demo-
cratic values).
292. See Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The Contradictions of Mainstream Consti-
tutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. Rnv. 1683, 1685 (1988).
democratic self-determination and the lived reality of the culturally
stratified.293
The general rule yielded by aggregating these equal protection
decisions tracks closely with Professor Karst's "equal citizenship"
principle, which holds that "[e]ach individual is presumptively entitled
to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and
participating member. 294 Translated into a rule of law, this principle
forbids political institutions to treat members of society as non-partici-
pants. Professor Balkin, in an article identifying equal protection with
the eradication of social status, suggests that invidiousness occurs
where a law denies members of a particular class the dignitary and
material benefits associated with access to critical institutions.295
Legislation such as the ADEA and ADA vindicates these basic
democratic values by speaking to a first principle of participation in a
manner that equalizes opportunity to enjoy society's dignitary and
material benefits. Because the legislation enforces the participation
interests of groups subject to exclusion through discrimination, it logi-
cally precedes a democratic vision of a federalism that fosters greater
citizen involvement.296 A judiciary that repels popular attempts to
valorize equality principles subverts the law's legitimacy. As Profes-
sor Michel Rosenfeld has put it, in a pluralist system, "legitimate con-
temporary law must emerge for all free and equal legal actors as both
self-imposed and binding."' 97 Or as Julian Eule has it, devolution
only affords the opportunity for state experimentation because the
293. See id.; Balkin, supra note 133 at 2365.
294. KENNE L. KARST, BELONGING TO A RICA: EQuAL CmZENsfIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 3 (1989).
295. See Balkin, supra note 133, at 2314,2361; see also White, supra note 134 (discussing
philosophical tension underlying equal protection review).
296. See also Davis v. Monroe City Bd. of Educ.,__ U.S.__,, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 1674
(1999) (ruling that schools may be held liable under Title IX for pervasive student-on-
student sexual harassment, despite vehement federalism-based dissent). Justice O'Connor,
in announcing the Davis decision from the bench, succinctly summarized the argument of
this section: the dissenters' suggested holding - that federalism principles preclude federal
intrusion in local matters-would "teach little Johnny a perverse lesson in federalism"
rather than "assure that little Mary may attend class,"-i.e. participate fully in critical insti-
tutions. Schools Liable for Harassment Teachers, Officials Must Stop Children Who Impair
Learning, ST~A-TRmur, May 25, 1999, at Al. The claim of logical priority is at root a
claim about law's legitimacy. In order for law followers to comply with law for reasons
other than fear of sanction, they must feel that they, along with the lawmakers, are stake-
holders in the system. See Frank A. Michelman, Forward: "Racialism" and Reason, 95
MicH. L. REv. 723, 739 & n.62 (1997) (discussing possible legitimizing function of demo-
cratic governance).
297. Michel Rosenfeld, Law as Discourse: Bridging the Gap Between Democracy and
Rights, 108 HA1v. L. Rnv. 1163, 1170-71 (1995) (book review).
VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL TENSIONS
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Federal Constitution provides a safety net.298 Judicial decisions that
privilege a sacrosanct federalism over participation interests suggest
that the states may "work without a net."
C. Reconciling City of Boerne's Conflicted Impulses: Brandeis and
Participation
The reading of equal protection offered in the previous section
attempts to reconcile and strengthen basic structural and democratic
principles that already command a consensus by virtue of their foun-
dational character. The thought of Justice Brandeis embodies this rec-
onciliation, as his jurisprudence encompassed both a strong belief in
the importance of state experimentation and aspiration toward the
achievement of democratic ideals. This section suggests that examina-
tion of Brandeisian virtues resolves the tensions between federalism
and equal protection.299
Brandeis did not advocate a purely structural notion of federal-
ism. A contextualized examination of his philosophy suggests that the
doctrine was not to be applied indiscriminately, but rather as a check
against the concentration of unaccountable power in the federal gov-
ernment.30 0 As with his thought generally, application of federalism
principles was governed by a thorough understanding of the factual
context and the resulting implications for human dignity.30'
Though an advocate of judicial restraint, Brandeis' adherence to
the doctrine did not extend to situations in which the rights of a polit-
ical minority were threatened. 3" Brandeis feared bigness in all mani-
festations, predicated on the belief that centralization of power bred
298. See Eule, supra note 291, at 1539.
299. The more immediate impetus for the choice of using Brandeis as a vehicle for
supporting the prioritization of equal protection principles over federalism principles is the
use by proponents of ascendent federalism of Brandeis' famous prescription of looking to
the states as laboratories of experimentation. See New State Ice. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262,310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
300. See PHmnPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROoREssrvIsM 73 (1993) (recounting
that Brandeis' vote against the National Industrial Recovery Act was explicable on the
basis of his fear of concentrated power).
301. Brandeis' arguments in support of federalism were an outgrowth of his legal phi-
losophy. He came to the Court with a fully developed jurisprudence, characterized by a
fear of bigness, an emphasis on facts and context as a precursor to effective decision-mak-
ing, a belief in experimentation as a catalyst for progress, and a correlative adherence to
limited judicial review, so as to best facilitate experimentation. See BRANDEIS ON DEMOC-
RAcy 15 (Philippa Strum ed. 1995) [hereinafter STRUM, DEMOCRACY].
302. See id. at 16.
corruption and inefficiency, and limited the opportunity for participa-
tion. While this concern, coupled with his conviction that experimen-
tation was the proper approach to resolving social problems, militated
strongly in favor of devolving power to the states, these beliefs did not
support a theory of constitutional interpretation that would grant to a
state the power to limit the political rights of its citizens. In fact, his
concern for political participation would have outweighed the other
considerations that informed his thought on the issue of federalism.
1. Brandeis on Federalism
Brandeis' suspicion of size in organizations of all kinds is well
documented. As an antitrust crusader, he argued that at some point
business reached a size at which it became inefficient and unaccounta-
ble in how it treated its workers and customers.30 3 Bigness in govern-
ment was every bit as dangerous as bigness in business. A notable
example of this belief was his vote in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States to strike down the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933 as delegating excessive power to the executive.3° This vote
against a piece of New Deal legislation was a manifestation of his be-
lief that the proper program for recovery from the Depression would
involve not only creative programs on the part of the federal govern-
ment, but also creative responses on the part of the states, facilitated
by federal grants.30 5 His rationale thus reflected two of Brandeis'
abiding, and related, concerns: the size of an organization and its ca-
pacity to facilitate participation. 0 6
303. See id. at 127-38 (collecting articles in which Brandeis advocated extending anti-
trust law to limit the size a business might attain). In today's world of weekly mega-merg-
ers, Brandeis' arguments sound antiquated. However, advances in technology, rather than
mistaken assumption on his part, have largely addressed Brandeis' concerns that an enter-
prise may become so large that a manager could not know all the details of operation,
resulting in waste and inefficiency. Moreover, the introduction of far more legal controls
on corporations (e.g., the National Labor Relations Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and
Title VII) have in some measure addressed his concerns regarding concentrated and unac-
countable power.
304. See 295 U.S. at 537-42; see also Aranson, et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation,
68 CORNELL L. Rnv. 1, 10 n.35 (1982) (relating that after the Schechter decision Brandeis
told a member of Roosevelt's administration that the Court was not going to allow the
federal government to centralize everything).
305. See STRuM, DEMOCRACY, supra note 301, at 195 (reprinting a conversation be-
tween Brandeis and Harry Shulman, a clerk during the 1929-1930 term, concerning Bran-
deis's "program for recovery").
306. See Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARv. L. Rnv. 33,67
(1931) ("[Mr. Justice Brandeis] believes in decentralization not because of any persisting
habit of political allegiance or through loyalty to an anachronistic theory of states' rights.
His views are founded on deep convictions regarding the manageable size for the effective
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Brandeis believed that democracy rests on twin pillars: first, the
principle that all persons are equally entitled to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness; second, that such equal opportunity will most
advance civilization."0 7 At root, however, was Brandeis' belief in the
dignity of all human beings. Democracy was for him the best system
for protecting this dignity. In Brandeis' formulation, democracy was
"impossible unless citizens possessed and acted upon a sense of civic
responsibility." 08 To that end, he defined liberty as "the right to en-
joy life, to acquire property, to pursue happiness in such manner and
to such extent only as the exercise of the right in each is consistent
with the exercise of a like right by every other of our fellow
citizens. ,3 09
As Professor Farber has demonstrated, Brandeis' protection of
libertarian interests in the area of free speech was motivated not by a
devotion to individual rights divorced from societal context, but rather
to an appreciation of how political liberty is necessary to the healthy
functioning of democracy.31 0 In Brandeis' view, individual freedoms
were not an end in themselves, but rather an instrument of the greater
public good; people should be free to develop their capacities in order
to ensure the betterment of society.' Brandeis' version of federalism
was not informed by his commitment to antiquated structural princi-
ples, but rather his belief, with John Dewey, that democracy was not
merely a form of social life, but rather "the precondition for the full
application of intelligence to the solution of social problems. '3 12
Likewise, federalism was not an end in itself, but rather a method of
ensuring the type of "robust and free-wheeling inquiry" associated
with Dewey's version of democratic governance.313 Brandeis shared
conduct of human affairs and the most favorable conditions for the exercise of wise
judgment.")
307. STRUM, DEMOCRACY, supra note 301, at 29.
308. Id. at 25.
309. Id. at 29.
310. See Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First
Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 182-83; cf Cover, supra note 7, at 1288 (commenting that
Brandeis understood free speech and education as "more fundamental" than various prop-
erty interests protected under the due process clause).
311. See Farber, supra note 310, at 185; see also CORNELL WESr, Tim AMERICAN EVA-
SION OF PMLOSoPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 3 (1989) (stating a Brandeisian
reconciliation of individualism and community-mindedness).
312. See Farber, supra note 310, at 186 (quoting Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of
Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. RPv. 1671, 1671 (1990) (explaining Dewey's theory of
the relationship between individual and democracy)).
313. See RICHARD POSNER, Tim PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 466 (1990) (stating ba-
sic premises of philosophical pragmatism, many of which are derived from Dewey's philos-
ophy); Farber, supra note 310, at 185 (noting Brandeis's commitment to "an openness to
Dewey's belief that experimentation was necessary to the facilitation
of both a sense of belonging and of individual liberty.314
Viewed through the prism of Brandeis' positions on democracy
and equality before the law, the meaning of his advocacy of devolu-
tion of power to the states becomes clearer. Because he feared cor-
ruption and centralized power on one hand and on the other insisted
that each individual should have the opportunity to participate in the
political process, Brandeis saw in the states an opportunity to check
the size and power of federal government and provide a forum for full
participation. Under such a formulation, the exclusion of a group
from the opportunity to participate would actually undermine one of
the rationales supporting Brandeis' advocacy of greater state auton-
omy and power. His purpose is assigning power to the states was not
to preclude disfavored minorities from participating in their communi-
ties, but rather to ensure that they could participate.
2. Reading New State Ice in Context
Brandeis' commitment to participation necessarily informed his
view of federalism. State experimentation is simultaneously facili-
tated and limited by the requisites of participatory democracy. The
safety net provided by the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that Con-
gress or the judiciary can redress instances where state action im-
pinges upon political rights.3 15
As Professor Friedman has observed, Brandeis' use of the term
experimentation is somewhat misleading.316 He might more properly
have used the term "innovation" to capture his sense that states must
have the capacity to respond to the exigencies of economic and social
upheaval. 1 7 Brandeis' New State Ice dissent illustrates this expedi-
ency. The case involved an Oklahoma statute that transformed the
experimentation and the courage to live without the comfort of unquestioned dogma"); see
also WEs-r, supra note 311 (explaining philosophical commitments of pragmatism, the
school of thought with which Dewey was associated).
314. Compare JoHN DEWEY, PmLosoPHY AND CrVIUZATnON 24 (1922) ("An empiri-
cism which is content with repeating facts already past has no place for possibility and for
liberty") with infra notes 318-20 and accompanying text.
315. See Eule, supra note 291.
316. See Friedman, supra note 11, at 399 (discussing the role of states in political
experimentation).
317. See id. (citing Deborah I. Merritt, Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REv.
541, 551 (1995)). Friedman recognizes that state legislative action is more reactive than
deliberative. See id. at 398 ("[T]he spirit of state experimentation is one of creative re-
sponse to immediate necessity."). That Brandeis shared this view is borne out by his re-
sponse to the Great Depression. See supra note 299.
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manufacture of ice into a utility, secure in its monopoly status by the
requirement that would-be competitors obtain a license upon demon-
strating "the necessity for the manufacture, sale or distribution of
ice." ' The majority determined that the manufacture and sale of ice
was properly characterized as a private business and therefore not
subject to intrusive state regulation.319
Brandeis emphasized in dissent that the United States was mired
in economic crisis, "confronted with emergency more serious than
war."320 With liberal citation to secondary and statistical sources,
Brandeis demonstrated rather convincingly that in the context of De-
pression-era Oklahoma, it may be quite reasonable to consider the
manufacture of ice as having sufficient public importance to support
the imposition of utility status.32 ' He bolstered this argument with
citations to precedent and historical practice showing the non-static
nature of the public utility.322
Despite this display of empirical support for Oklahoma's deci-
sion, Brandeis' primary concern was with the role of the Court in as-
sessing legislative judgment. While allowing that "nobody knows"
whether prevailing economic and social views stated an appropriate
remedy to the ills visited upon the country, he thought it irresponsible
of the Court to erect barriers to attempts at recovery.323 This view
was not a function of Brandeis' commitment to federalism principles,
but rather the more pragmatic view that the Court should not impede
a program of recovery. Brandeis did not reprove the majority for in-
truding on state judgment so much as legislative judgment generally:
318. See 285 U.S. 262, 271 (1932).
319. See id- at 272-73. The majority reached this conclusion under the Fourteenth
Amendment, ruling that regulation of ice manufacture transcended the extent to which the
Constitution permits the regulation of business. See iL at 280.
320. See id. at 306.
321. For example, Brandeis noted that the "mean normal temperature in [Oklahoma]
from May to September is 76.4 degrees," id. at 287 n.8, that radical developments had
occurred in the ice manufacturing industry, id. at 287 n.9, that the import of ice for house-
hold and commercial purposes could not be overstated, id. at 287-89 nn.10-14, that most
Oklahomans could not practically aspire to privately produce ice, id. at 289-90 nn.15-17,
and that ice manufacture lends itself to utility status, id. at 291-93 nn.18-23.
322. See id. at 284, 294. Records of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission and pro-
ceedings before Oklahoma courts and regulatory bodies indicated that the state had admi-
rably overseen the manufacture and sale of ice. See id. at 294-97 nn.26-34; see also id. at
306 (noting historical precedent for common callings being subject to regulation).
323. Id. at 309. Immediately on the heels of the felicitous phrase for which the opinion
is known, Brandeis wrote that "This Court has the power to prevent an experiment....
But, in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our
prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our
minds be bold." Id. at 311.
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There must be power in the states and the nation to remold, through
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet
changing social and economic needs.3 24 Brandeis saw the danger
posed by the Court's decision not in terms of federal intrusion on state
prerogatives, but rather in judicial overreaching. The structure at is-
sue in New State Ice was horizontal, not vertical."2
Brandeis understood the importance of separation of powers
principles as a check on unaccountable and concentrated government
power.3 26 This check not only renders tractable congressional im-
pulses to overrule the Court, but also places limitations, including the
interest of states in remaining free from unnecessary federal intrusion,
on congressional judgment. As demonstrated in the common conclu-
sion yielded by the distinct approaches of the Kimel and Brown
courts, federalism untethered by separation of powers doctrine is ex-
traneous to the question of whether the ADEA and ADA are permis-
sible exercises of section 5 enforcement power. While not inapposite,
federalism principles are unnecessary to resolution of the question
faced in Kimel. For much of our nation's history, states played the
primary role in developing economic programs.327 There is no foun-
dational reason that states cannot continue to play the lead role in
public-minded experimentation. This role must not, however, consign
significant portions of society to the part of permanent understudies.
V. Conclusion
Despite wishful thinking on the part of some courts and commen-
tators, Boerne is not a landmark decision. It is instead an affirmation
of the traditional separation of powers between Congress and the ju-
diciary. A non-activist reading of the decision yields the conclusion
that the separation of powers and federalism components of the deci-
sion are not in tension, but rather that federalism only seems like an
independent ground for decision due to the unprecedented intrusive-
ness of the legislation at issue. Moreover, judicial enforcement of fed-
eralism principles should be tempered by recognition that federal
antidiscrimination law serves to ensure full participatory access for all
the citizens of a state. The traditional argument of the federal govern-
324. Id. at 311.
325. Nonetheless, the dissent is most frequently invoked as justifying federalism. See
James A. Gardner, The "States-As-Laboratories" Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30
VAt. U. L. REv. 475, 483 (1996).
326. See STRUM, DEMOCRACY, supra note 301, at 95; Frankfurter, supra note 306, at 97-
98 (explaining Brandeis's views on separation of powers).
327. See Yoo, supra note 262, at 1403.
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ment as a superior guardian of rights is bolstered when one recognizes
meaningful participatory access as a precondition to healthy state au-
tonomy. To the extent that federal antidiscrimination legislation
favoring the disabled and the aged can be understood as ensuring par-
ticipatory access for these groups, such laws should be understood as
promoting, not intruding upon, state autonomy.
Our system of governance is a gamble that democratic values are
superior. But superiority is not the same thing as inevitability. Demo-
cratic values are emulated not because of a teleological inclination to-
ward liberal democracy,a28 but because they maximize happiness.
Because those who have already reaped the benefits of this system
may wish to opt out, on the ground that their own privileged position
in society is a function of merit, rather than historical accident, demo-
cratic values must be enforced to ensure that all members of society
have an opportunity to enjoy the fruits of those values. As Justice
Brandeis recognized, the purpose behind federalism is to implement a
shared set of beliefs about what small, engaged groups of individuals
can accomplish. A system of federalism that precludes participation
by large segments of society offends this basic principle.
328. But see FRANcIs FuKtYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AN) =m LAST MAN (1992)
(reviving Hegel's view of history as teleologically-inclined but with the twist that it inclines
toward liberal democracy).
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